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The basic moral problem . . . is inherent in education itself. If you are en-
gaged in an effort to influence the course of children's development. . . . [it]
is to determine, in part, what kinds of people they turn out to be. It is to
create human beings. It is, therefore, to play God.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The need for a definition of the functions and goals of public
education is a pressing problem in our society. American society is
characterized by increasing alienation,1 weakening family ties,2 and
waning church influence. s The result is that education will play a
greater role as one of the remaining institutions to help reach soci-
etal consensus and ensure the continued vitality of American de-
mocracy.4 Increasing controversy and litigation over students' and
parents' rights in the educational process demonstrate widespread
concern with the role of public education.' As the complexities of
* Bereiter, Moral Alternatives to Education, 3 INTERCHANGE, Jan.-Mar. 1972, at 25, 27.
1. See generally A. MONTAGUE & F. MATSON, THE DEHUMANIZATION OF MAN (1983); D.
REGIN, SOURCES OF CULTURAL ESTRANGEMENT (1969); A. SCHAFF, ALIENATION AS A SOCIAL PHE-
NOMENON (1980).
2. The divorce rate in the United States more than doubled between 1965 and 1979.
Price-Bonham & Balswick, The Noninstitutions: Divorce, Desertion, and Remarriage, 42 J.
MARRIAGE & FAMILY 959 (1980). In a 1979 Gallup Poll of American families nearly one-half
of the respondents felt that family life had deteriorated in the past 15 years. See WHITE
HOUSE CONFERENCE ON FAMILIES, LISTENING TO AMERICA's FAMILIES 180 (1980).
3. Purpel & Ryan, Moral Education: Where Sages Fear to Tread, 56 PHI DELTA KAP-
PAN 659, 660 (1975). Today, roughly 40% of Americans have virtually no contact with con-
gregations as worshipping entities. Roof, American Religion in Transition: A Review and
Interpretation of Recent Trends, 31 SOCIAL COMPASS 173, 284 (1984).
4. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). The Court stated in Brown:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Id. Justice Powell, in his dissent, also noted that "fin an age when the home and church
play a diminishing role in shaping the character and value judgments of the young, a heavier
responsibility falls upon the schools." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 593 (1975) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
5. See, e.g., Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986) (chal-
lenging a school district's refusal to permit prayer club meetings during activity periods);
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986) (challenging a deletion
of two full pages from student newspaper), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 926 (1987); San Diego
Comm. Against Registration and the Draft v. Governing Bd., 790 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1986)
(challenging a school board's exclusion of anti-draft advertisement in school newspaper);
Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440 (D. Me. 1986) (challenging a student's suspension for
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modern society increase and the public begins to believe American
cultural values have become dysfunctional, school authorities and
dissenting families come into conflict in their attempts to create
order out of the apparent chaos." As a result, the judiciary has be-
come involved in determining the rights of the various actors in
the educational arena.
United States Supreme Court cases over the last sixty-five
years have defined the rights of school authorities, parents, and
students.7 In many of these cases the Court either explicitly or im-
plicitly developed and applied its own concept of the proper role of
education in society. Beginning in the 1920s and continuing
through the Court's 1969 decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Com-
munity School District,' the Court effectively applied a "progres-
sive" model of education that emphasized a participatory educa-
tional process with maximum student interaction and independent
thought.' Six years later, however, the Court was sharply divided
in Goss v. Lopez'0 over the proper function of education. Subse-
quent decisions indicated further shifts away from a progressive
model to a greater emphasis on a school's function as the inculca-
tor of fundamental values under what educators label the "cultural
transmission ideology."" In the 1986 Bethel School District No.
403 v. Fraser2 decision the Court's concept of education heavily
emphasized the inculcative aspects of the public school. The Court
apparently now has adopted the cultural transmission ideology, a
decision that may curtail the expansive participatory student
rights granted in Tinker under the progressive ideology.'3
This Note traces the Court's development of a philosophy of
making a vulgar gesture to a teacher off school grounds); Student Coalition for Peace v.
Lower Merion School Dist. Bd. of School Directors, 633 F. Supp. 1040 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (seek-
ing an injunction to stop school board from banning student antinuclear and peace exposi-
tion on school grounds); see also D. KIRP & M. YUDOF, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW
(1974).
6. S, ARONS, COMPELLING BELIEF 196 (1983); cf. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THE-
ORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 39 (1966) (promoting the need for increased protection of
freedom of expression because complexity of political issues and mass democracy have made
the public more susceptible to manipulation).
7. See infra notes 54-167 and accompanying text.
8. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
9. For a discussion of the progressive ideology, see infra notes 43-53 and accompany-
ing text.
10. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
11. For a discussion of the cultural transmission ideology, see infra notes 19-34 and
accompanying text.
12. 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
13. For a discussion of Tinker, see infra notes 85-113 and accompanying text.
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education and the impact of that philosophy on students' partici-
pation in the educational process. Part II outlines three basic
streams of educational thought and their impact on the roles of the
school and student. Part III examines the Court's changing posi-
tion on the proper function of education. Part IV analyzes Fraser
and the Court's adoption of the cultural transmission model for
education. Finally, Part V argues that the Court should have re-
solved Fraser by applying the Tinker disruption standard, which
properly allows maximum student involvement in the educational
process without significantly hindering the socializing function of
the public schools.
II. THE THREE STREAMS OF EDUCATIONAL IDEOLOGY
Education serves an essential and unique role in our culture.
Education is essential because it is the process through which chil-
dren are inducted into society to become leaders and productive
societal members. The school environment "alters the child's con-
cept of reality and, therefore, his perception of and reaction to all
things."' 4 Adult attitudes stem, at least in part, from childhood ex-
periences, a major part of which occur within the school setting.15
Public education is a unique societal institution because education,
although it is supposed to transmit widely accepted cultural norms
and values to children,' 6 is a process through which the child de-
velops as an individual and grows into a mature and discerning
adult.
17
These two requirements of public education-the need to inte-
grate children into society and the need to allow them to develop
as individuals-often conflict. To effectively impart cultural values,
educators may stifle individualism through direct suppression of
diverse ideas or through indirect discouragement of diversity. Edu-
cators may employ a system of rewards and punishments or any
number of techniques to ensure that students "learn" the habits
and knowledge deemed essential to productive lives. If the state
14. Arons & Lawrence, The Manipulation of Consciousness: A First Amendment Cri-
tique of Schooling, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 309, 317 (1980).
15. Cf. H. HYMAN, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION 21 (1959) (arguing totality of childhood
experiences is partly responsible for adult political patterns).
16. See infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
17. One goal of education is to "enable children to develop the skills, attitudes, and
opportunities to become literate, happy, independent, and successful adults." Gordon, Free-
dom of Expression and Values Inculcation in the Public School Curriculum, 13 J.L. &
EDuc. 523, 579 (1984).
[Vol. 40:939
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heavily emphasizes the socializing function, the state may create
children unable to exercise fully the freedom of choice essential to
a democracy. If the state, however, overemphasizes individualism,
the child's development may be inadequate for him to integrate
into society. Society's definition of the role of education and the
proper methods to fulfill that role determine the extent to which
individualism and student expression are tolerated or even en-
couraged. The three following ideologies categorize societal defini-
tions of the proper function of education: the cultural transmission
ideology, the romantic ideology, and the progressive ideology. i s
A. Cultural Transmission
The cultural transmission ideology defines education as the
transmission of knowledge, skills, morals, and social rules to the
student. 19 This ideology assumes that children internalize learned
material through explicit instruction and a system of rewards and
punishments. 20 The cultural transmission ideology employs an as-
sociationist-learning theory21 best explained by the metaphor of a
machine. The school environment provides "inputs" of information
that the student/machine stores and then "outputs" as behavior. 2
Because the child's internal thought processes merely reflect physi-
cal and social inputs, cultural transmissionists see the educational
process as a guided acquisition of knowledge that reinforces desira-
ble responses and eliminates undesirable ones. 3
The cultural transmission ideology defines educational objec-
tives using a prediction of success or an "industrial psychology"
strategy. The immediate objective of education is the acquisition of
knowledge and skills, measured in the short term by grades on re-
port cards and in the long term by social status and power.24 In a
pure form the learning of culturally accepted values is not based
18. Although many articles and books address the proper purposes and theories of
education, see, e.g., R. DERR, A TAXONOMY OF SOCIAL PURPOSES OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A HAND-
BOOK (1973); W. FRANKENA, PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (1965), this Note applies the three
ideologies outlined by Lawrence Kohlberg and Rochelle Mayer. See Kohlberg & Mayer, De-
velopment as the Aim of Education, 42 HARV. EDUC. REV. 449 (1972). These ideologies, al-
though highly simplified, reflect the general philosophical scheme of education. See gener-
ally T. BRAMELD, PATTERNS OF EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY: DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE IN
CULTUROLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1971); J. STRAIN, MODERN PHILOSOPHIES OF EDUCATION (1971).
19. Kohlberg & Mayer, supra note 18, at 452-53.
20. Id.
21. See B. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971).
22. Kohlberg & Mayer, supra note 18, at 456.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 460-61.
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on principles of knowledge or development, but is simply the ac-
quisition of material at the child's present level of thought. Thus,
the purpose of education is not to encourage individual growth, but
to assure the internalization of established norms, with the child's
need to learn societal discipline receiving particular emphasis.2 5
The cultural transmission theory is rooted in the tradition of
American education. Religious institutions, whose primary purpose
was to inculcate orthodoxy, operated American schools during the
colonial period. 6 Even after the acceptance of separation of church
and state in this country,27 public educators emphasized inculca-
tion in response to the huge influx of immigrants in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries.2 One commentator ex-
pressed an historical truism, stating that "[v]alue inculcation,
rather than value neutrality, has been the tradition of public edu-
cation since the beginning of the American Republic. '29
The cultural transmission ideology seriously overvalues incul-
cation in education and threatens the desirable presence of diverse
thought and expression in public schools.30 This ideology reduces
the child's expressive rights because the child does not contribute
to the acquisition process; the child passively receives societal val-
ues. Although the precise effects of the cultural transmission ideol-
ogy are difficult to identify3" and commentators differ over the
25. Id. at 454.
26. R. BUTTS & L. CREMIN, A HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 98, 120, 191
(1953). See generally R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREE-
DOM IN THE UNITED STATES 261-412 (1955). An example of this value inculcation is the "Old
Deluder Satan Act" of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, which required education to keep
Satan at bay. See A. MEYER, AN EDUCATIONAL HISTORY OF THE WESTERN WORLD 189 (1965)
(tracing the emphasis on inculcation in Massachusetts schools).
27. See R. BUTTS & L. CREMIN, supra note 26, at 215.
28. Douglas, Parental Rights in Public Schools, LMERTY, Sept.-Oct. 1976, at 19, 19-20.
Society saw value inculcation as necessary either to help assimilate immigrants into their
new society or to protect the American way of life. See L. CREMIN, THE AMERICAN COMMON
SCHOOL, AN HISTORIC CONCEPTION 22-23, 44-47 (1951).
29. Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial
Intervention, 59 TEx. L. REV. 477, 499 (1981).
30. For an analysis of the benefits of student expression in education, see the discus-
sion of the progressive ideology infra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
31. Official prescription of proper behavior and acceptable morals and beliefs has
never risen to a level at which dissenting students could prove a conspiracy to mold them
into homogeneous citizens. A major problem to legal redress against majoritarian indoctrina-
tion is the difficulty of defining public school orthodoxy. S. ARONS, supra note 6, at x-xi, 70.
Nevertheless, increasing controversy over curriculum content and free speech in public
schools indicates that the socializing function of public schools has hindered some families
in their efforts to preserve unorthodox beliefs and minority values. Id. at x-xi.
[Vol. 40:939
EDUCATIONAL IDEOLOGY
proper response to such inculcation,32 the Supreme Court limited
the cultural transmission ideology beginning in the early 1920s
33
and has continued to struggle with the problem. 4
B. Romanticism
The romantic ideology centers on the child as an individual
and the child's discovery of an inner self. 5 The romantic views ed-
ucation as the unfolding of an innate pattern of development facil-
itated by the proper environment.36 The metaphor of the physical
growth of a plant or animal best represents the romantic philoso-
phy. The educational environment simply aids the child's prepat-
terned development by providing nourishment for natural
growth. Romantics believe that the child's realization of an inner
self is the most important aspect of education; therefore, the
school environment should provide sufficient freedom to allow the
child's inner abilities and social virtues to control the child's anti-
social behavior.3 8 A heavily inculcative education is unacceptable
to the romanticist because meaningless mechanical learning drills
suppress the child's inner "good."
The romantic ideology defines educational objectives in terms
of a "bag of virtues," a set of traits constituting the ideal healthy
individual.39 The child realizes innate capacities if left to follow a
native bent under this maturationist theory of development.40 Stu-
32. Compare S. ARONS, supra note 6, at 189 (calling for complete separation of school
and state to halt value conflicts and condemning the undermining of individual freedom of
belief in public schools) with J. TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND 85 (1977) (calling
government education a legitimate presence in the sphere of the mind).
A comprehensive treatment of the legitimacy of governmental participation in the mar-
ketplace of ideas is beyond the scope of this Note; however, for detailed discussions of the
"government speech" doctrine, see Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political
Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104 (1979); Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 565 (1980); Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Gov-
ernment Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 863 (1979).
33. See infra notes 54-66 and accompanying text.
34. A specific example is the six separate opinions filed in Board of Education v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853 (1982). See infra notes 144-67 and accompanying text.
35. Kohlberg & Mayer, supra note 18, at 45-52. Although this ideology originated with
Rousseau, its current advocates are the followers of Freud and Gesell. Id. at 451. See J.J.
ROUSSEAU. EMILE Ou DE L'EDUCATION (1762); A. FREUD, THE EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF
DEFENSE (1946).
36. Kohlberg & Mayer, supra note 18, at 451-52.
37. Id. at 455.
38. Id. at 451-52.
39. Id. at 476.
40. See generally J. LANGER, THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT (1969).
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dent interaction and expression are part of the permissive environ-
ment, but such activity is not directed or encouraged.41 Thus, ro-
mantics undervalue any inculcative or directive presence in the
educational process.
Although implicitly present in only one Supreme Court opin-
ion,42 the romantic philosophy is important because it represents
the antithesis of the cultural transmission ideology and a possible
response to excessive inculcation in the public schools. Whereas
cultural transmission centers on society and molds the child in
conformity to cultural norms, the romantic ideology stresses the
child's unique aspects and allows the child absolute freedom to de-
velop. The progressivist ideology represents a balance between
these two ideologies.
41. Cf. J. DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 112-14 (1916) (calling unsupervised de-
velopment "random and capricious").
42. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), both the majority and concurring
opinions endorsed a limited application of the romantic ideology. Wisconsin sought to en-
force its compulsory education laws against Amish parents for refusing to send their chil-
dren to public school after the eighth grade. The Court held that both the first and four-
teenth amendments prevented the state from compelling the Amish children to attend a
formal high school through age 16.
Although, strictly speaking, Yoder rests on establishment clause grounds and the rights
of parents to direct the upbringing of their children, 406 U.S. at 233-34, the Court's analysis
relies on the notion that the Amish view education as the "preparation of the child for life
in the separated agrarian bommunity that is the keystone of the Amish faith." Id. at 222.
This suggests that, at least in this instance, the Court adopted as a goal of education the
preparation of children for the kind of life their parents and subculture intend for them to
live.
Yoder implicitly rejected both the cultural transmission and progressivist ideologies. If
the Court strictly applied the cultural transmission ideology, no exemption would be al-
lowed because the greater good of society would dictate that Amish children receive maxi-
mum exposure to majoritarian values. On the other hand, if the Court applied a progressiv-
ist ideology, the children's own preferences and beliefs would be a major factor because their
lives might be destroyed by a denial of education. For a discussion of progressivism, see
infra notes 43-53 and accompanying text. Justice Douglas applied this progressivist position
in his dissent. See 406 U.S. at 245 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
Under the romantic ideology, the state's only interest in Yoder is providing the proper
environment for the child's personal growth. This interest pales in comparison to the paren-
tal right to direct the upbringing of children. Under a progressive or cultural transmission
ideology, the state's interest is bolstered by the interests of the children themselves or soci-
ety's interest in socialization-either of which may outweigh parental rights.
The relationship between the interests of parents, their children, and the state in the
educational process is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion of these interrelation-
ships, see Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights Of, In, and For Children, 39 LAW & CON-




The progressivist ideology builds on the works of John
Dewey 3 and maintains that the touchstone of education is contin-
ued growth. For the progressivist, education's primary goal is to
develop the child's thought processes. The child acquires devel-
oped thought, not through strict maturation (romantic ideology) or
direct learning (cultural transmission ideology), but through stu-
dent-environment interaction that causes a reorganization of psy-
chological patterns.44 According to the progressivist, the driving
force of education is the child's active thinking, stimulated by cog-
nitive conflict;45 therefore, the educational environment should
maximize the students' active role.
Progressivism is an intangible, dialectical process 46 in which
the child is not viewed as a plant or a machine, but as a philoso-
pher developing ideas through discourse.47 The objective of this
process is not to stimulate behavior, but to reorganize and redefine
the child's thought processes through confrontational discourse.4 s
Unlike both the romantic's concept of development through nur-
turing and the cultural transmissionist's concept of development
through static acquisition of knowledge, the progressivist encour-
ages discoursive development by actively stimulating the child to
reach higher levels of thought through a presentation of resolvable
conflicts. 49 Thus, the progressivist strives to ensure the child's pro-
gression toward a more developed psychological state.50
43. See, e.g., J. DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION (1916); EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION
(1938); THE CHILD AND THE CURRICULUM (1902); MORAL PRINCIPLES IN EDUCATION (1909).
44. Kohlberg & Mayer, supra note 18, at 457.
45. Id. at 454.
46. Id. at 455. John Dewey and Jean Piaget molded the dialectical metaphor, first
developed by Plato, into a psychological method. See J. PIAGET, JUDGMENT AND REASONING
IN THE CHILD (1928); THE LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT OF THE CHILD (1926).
47. Kohlberg & Mayer, supra note 18, at 457.
48. Id. John Dewey rejected the concept that growth or development is movement
toward a fixed goal; the adult environment is not a standard against which children are
measured. According to Dewey, if growth is regarded as being an end rather than having an
end, then educators may abandon the view that instruction supplies adult knowledge by
pouring facts into a hole. See J. DEWEY, supra note 41, at 50-51.
49. Kohlberg & Mayer, supra note 18, at 454. John Dewey was the first to fully formu-
late this approach to education known as the cognitive-developmental approach. Dewey's
approach is cognitive because it emphasizes active change in the child's patterns of thought
rather than learning a set of culturally accepted rules. See J. DEWEY, What Psychology Can
Do for the Teacher, in JOHN DEWEY ON EDUCATION: SELECTED WRITINGS 195 (R. Archam-
bault ed. 1964).
50. But cf. Bereiter, Educational Implications of Kohlberg's Cognitive-Developmen-
tal View, 1 INTERCHANGE 25-30 (1970) (stating that the determination of whether a behavior
1987]
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The progressive ideology, which emphasizes progression
through stages of development,51 highly values student expression
and independent thought. Child development must include expo-
sure to more sophisticated thought requiring resolution of cogni-
tive conflicts by active participation in the education process.2
The greater the stimulation, the faster the advancement. Progres-
sivists encourage student expression and diversity because expres-
sive behavior of students contributes to the learning environment.
Children at more advanced cognitive levels challenge and influence
less developed children to move to higher levels of thought. Al-
though the progressivist educator moderates or guides this dialecti-
cal process, the structure of the learning process itself minimizes
value inculcation.53
Supreme Court opinions over the last half century represent
each of the above ideologies, and a pattern of development
emerges upon closer inspection. The Court's attitudes toward edu-
cation have changed over time and continue to evolve. Implicit
support of a particular ideology in a case may be result-oriented, a
more conservative Court, hoping to restrict student rights, may
change ideologies to accommodate that restriction. The ideologies,
change is development is a theoretical matter and too vague for practical use); Peters, A
Reply to Kohlberg, 56 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 678 (1975)(identifying weaknesses in cognitive-
developmental theory).
51. The foundation of the cognitive-developmental theory underlying the progressive
ideology is the doctrine of cognitive stages forming an invariant sequence of development.
Kohlberg & Mayer, supra note 18, at 457-58. Each stage represents a more sophisticated
level of thought, stems from the previous one, and paves the way for the next higher stage.
If a child remains too long at one level of development, it becomes increasingly difficult to
stimulate upward movement. Id at 489-90. Therefore, continued and vigorous interaction
among students tempered only by the Tinker disruption standard, see infra note 94 and
accompanying text, appears to maximize opportunities for continued growth.
52. The benefits of this type of progressive technique have been demonstrated in an
empirical study employing classroom discussion modeled after Kohlberg's cognitive-develop-
mental theory. See Kohlberg, The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education,
56 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 670, 677 n.11 (1975).
53. Kohlberg states that the educator's stimulation of movement to higher levels of
thought is not indoctrinative for four reasons:
1. Change is in the way of reasoning rather than in the particular beliefs involved.
2. Students in a class are at different stages; the aim is to aid movement of each to
the next stage, not convergence on a common pattern.
3. The teacher's own opinion is neither stressed nor invoked as authoritative. It
enters only as one of many opinions, hopefully one of those at a next higher stage.
4. The notion that some judgments are more adequate than others is communi-
cated. Fundamentally, however, this means that the student is encouraged to articulate
a position which seems most adequate to him and to judge the adequacy of the reason-
ing of others
Kohlberg, supra note 52, at 674.
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nevertheless, provide a framework for analysis of the Court's opin-
ions in the educational sphere.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S CHANGING EDUCATIONAL IDEOLOGY
A. The Early Cases: Meyer, Pierce, and Barnette
In 1923 the Court first recognized limitations on state indoc-
trinative interests and implicitly restricted the traditional cultural
transmission ideology in Meyer v. Nebraska.54 In Meyer the Court
struck down a statute prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages
to children who had not completed the eighth grade, finding the
statute to be an unconstitutional interference with "the calling of
modern language teachers ...and with the power of parents to
control the education of their own [children]. '55 Although recog-
nizing the state's inculcative interests,56 the Court disapproved of
any state power to proscribe the study of certain disfavored sub-
jects. The Meyer Court rejected a Platonic model of education,57
under which the state controls all the inputs and outputs in the
educational process, and found that the means chosen to advance
the state's interest in homogeneity infringed on the rights of teach-
ers, children, and parents.
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,"5 the Court
invalidated an Oregon law requiring all children to attend public
school by applying the principle in Meyer that parents are free to
supervise their children's education. 59 The Pierce Court explicitly
rejected the pure cultural transmission theory, finding no "general
power of the State to standardize its children."'60 Although the
54. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
55. Id. at 401; see also Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923) (companion case).
56. "The desire of the Legislature to foster a homogenous people with American ideals
prepared readily to understand current discussions of civic matters is easy to appreciate
.... The power of the state to ... prescribe a curriculum ... [is] not within the present
controversy." Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402.
57. Plato had recommended a law for his Ideal Commonwealth which provided
"'[t]hat the wives of our guardians are to be common.., and no parent is to know his own
child, nor any child his parent .... The proper officers will take the offspring of the good
parents to the pen or fold, and. . . deposit them with certain nurses.'" 262 U.S. at 401-02.
This Platonic model is cultural transmission carried to its logical extreme. The Court does
not reject Plato's goal of training children to reach their full potential in order to optimize
social gain; however, the Court's rejection of the Platonic model demonstrates that democ-
racy is incompatible with the full force of Plato's theory. See J. DEwEY, supra note 41, at
309.
58. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
59. Id. at 534-35.
60. Id. at 535. The Court stated: "The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all
1987]
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Court decided Meyer and Pierce under the old substantive due
process standard,61 and the continued relevance of the two deci-
sions has been questioned,6 2 modern courts accept their pro-
nouncements concerning parental rights.6 3
The Court in Meyer and Pierce did not explicitly mention the
proper role of education in society; nevertheless, in these cases the
Court began to accommodate the rights of students and parents
and the inculcative interests of school authorities. Both the state's
inculcative interest and a progressivist interest in exposing chil-
dren to a wider range of ideas and experiences than were available
at home justify a general compulsory education requirement. A
compulsory education statute mandating public school attendance,
however, creates a dangerous state monopoly on education under
which the state might limit children's exposure to controversial
subjects." The Pierce Court checked the indoctrinative power of
the state by assuring that some children may have a private educa-
tion relatively free from state control.6 5 Meyer and Pierce demon-
strate the Court's willingness to limit the state's inculcative power
over children,66 but do not signal adoption of any educational ide-
ology by the Court.
The Court did not address the question of limits on the state's
inculcative role and, more specifically, the proper role of education
in society again until the 1943 decision of West Virginia Board of
governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only." Id. at 535.
61. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See generally G. GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 441-585 (11th ed. 1985); L. TRBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§ 15-1 to 15-21 (1978).
62. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 519
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for its reliance on the substantive due
process cases of Meyer and Bartels).
63. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1979) (plurality opinion); Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
64. Note, State Indoctrination and the Protection of Non-State Voices in the
Schools: Justifying a Prohibition of School Library Censorship, 35 STAN. L. REv. 497, 529-30
(1983).
65. Id. at 530. The protections of Pierce are limited, however, because most people do
not have the financial resources to exercise the private school option. See Yudof, supra note
32, at 890 n.101.
66. The Court decided both cases during the post-World War I period when states
were under political pressures to use their schools to create a more ideologically homogene-
ous people. This historical setting supports the theory that the Court's major concern was
limiting the state's indoctrinative power. See Moskowitz, The Making of the Moral Child:
Legal Implications of Values Education, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 105, 110-12 (1978).
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Education v. Barnette.7 Barnette concerned the constitutionality
of a mandatory flag salute statute requiring all children in the pub-
lic school system to salute the American flag.68 In striking down
the statute as violative of the first amendment, the Court simulta-
neously approved and disapproved of state indoctrinative goals.
Speaking through Justice Jackson, the Court acknowledged the
cultural transmission ideology and the constitutional validity of
value inculcation in public secondary education by stating that
"the State may 'require teaching by instruction and study of all in
our history ... which tend to inspire patriotism and love of coun-
try.' "69 Although recognizing the legitimacy of teaching by persua-
sion and example, Justice Jackson also declared, "[i]f there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, na-
tionalism, religion or other matters.
'70
The Court viewed the compulsory flag salute statute as com-
pelling students to declare a belief and found that the statute sub-
verted the slow and constitutionally permissible route of informing
students about the flag and its meaning.7 1 According to the Court,
the institution of education is not based on a coercive elimination
of dissent, but on education by persuasion and example. 72 Further-
more, the Barnette Court recognized the importance of education
67. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
68. The statute defined a failure to salute as "insubordination," remedied by expulsion
without possibility of readmission until compliance. Jehovah's Witnesses challenged the
statute after the school expelled their children for failing to salute the American flag; subse-
quently, the state instituted delinquency proceedings. Id. at 629-30.
69. Id. at 631 (quoting Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604
(1940)(Stone, J., dissenting)). The Barnette Court explicitly reversed Gobitis only three
years after it was decided.
70. Id. at 642.
71. Id. at 631.
72. "To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary
and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the
appeal of our institutions to free minds." Id. at 641. The Court also noted that any attempt
to impose ideological discipline through public education would force each societal faction
to seek control of the process and, failing that, attempt to weaken it. Id. at 637.
However, Justice Powell's concept of local control implicitly adopted in Fraser involves
just such factional conflict. See infra note 207. Under a system of local majoritarian control,
those groups with sufficient funds but insufficient political power either place their children
in private schools, thereby weakening the public school system, or relocate to areas where
local political powers reflect their beliefs. Those with neither funds nor influence must ei-
ther renounce their own values and let the system co-opt them or retain those values and be
labelled "different," "insubordinate," or "underachievers." See Arons & Lawrence, supra
note 14, at 328-32. The Fraser Court appears to dismiss the problem of factional conflict
over the proper values to be inculcated-a problem recognized by the Barnette Court.
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as a forum for introducing students to first amendment values.73
Some commentators have used the Court's seemingly contra-
dictory adoption of both indoctrinative and individualistic aspects
of education to discount the Court's condemnation of indoctrina-
tion.74 The two aspects, however, need not be inconsistent. Culti-
vating appreciation for the meaning of the flag and the Constitu-
tion not only serves the broad inculcative goals of preparing
children for citizenship and transmitting basic cultural values, but
also exposes students to diverse views and requires them to think
critically. The prohibition against coercion prevents the children's
mindless memorization of less consensual topics. Although recog-
nizing the dual nature of public schools, the Court simply drew a
general boundary beyond which indoctrinative efforts are imper-
missible rather than define permissible indoctrinative goals or
methods in an ideologically consistent framework of education.
Thus, the Court began developing an educational ideology in
Meyer, Pierce, and Barnette. With Meyer and Pierce in the early
1920s, the Court examined the interests of parents, students, and
the state in public education without fully rejecting the historically
accepted cultural transmission model of education and without
precisely defining the extent to which free inquiry and progressiv-
ism must prevail. In Barnette the Court differentiated between ac-
ceptable "encouragement" and unacceptable "coercion" by the
state, but failed to establish an educational ideology to govern the
Court's decisionmaking.
B. The Court's Adoption of an Educational Ideology: Sweezy,
Keyishian, and Tinker
1. Higher Public Education
In contrast to the Court's earlier approval of state indoctrina-
tion-and,impliedly, the cultural transmission theory-in primary
and secondary public education cases, the Court rejected strict
state indoctrination in higher education. The Court first advocated
a progressive ideology at the university level in Sweezy v. New
73. "That [the schools] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupu-
lous protection of constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free
mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as
mere platitudes." 319 U.S. at 637.
74. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 32, at 567 (asserting that Barnette had nothing to do
with official prescription of orthodoxy, but was concerned only with the rights of
nonconformists).
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Hampshire.5 Sweezy concerned a college professor's contempt
conviction for his failure to answer questions propounded by the
Attorney General of New Hampshire acting pursuant to legislative
authority to investigate subversive activities.78 Although Sweezy
technically was a due process case,77 in dicta the Court recognized
a broader concept of education at the university level-one that
stressed education's value to the individual student.
Emphasizing academic freedom, Sweezy evinced the Court's
initial adoption of an "analytical" model-closely paralleling the
progressive model-for higher education that focused on student
growth and development through wide exposure to diverse ideas
and beliefs."5 The plurality recognized that academic freedom in
American universities was necessary to ensure an active, vital cul-
ture.79 The Court reaffirmed the progressive ideology for higher ed-
ucation in Keyishian v. Board of Regents.80 In Keyishian the
Court stated that academic freedom is "a special concern of the
first amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom. . . . The classroom is peculiarly
the 'marketplace of ideas.' ,81
The inculcative mission of primary and secondary public edu-
cation-to instill in children society's values-directly conflicts
75. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). But see Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (uphold-
ing loyalty oath requirement for teachers in New York public schools and colleges).
76. The post-World War II anticommunist movement in the United States precipi-
tated the passage of loyalty oath statutes at both the federal and state levels. Legislatures
designed these oath requirements to purge public agencies and private associations of all
"subversive influences." See generally R. BROWN, LOYALTY AND SECURITY (1972).
77. 354 U.S. at 254-55. The Court reversed the contempt conviction because the attor-
ney general had no authority to elicit the information from the professor, thereby violating
due process.
78. See Keiter, Judicial Review of Student First Amendment Claims: Assessing the
Legitimacy-Competency Debate, 50 Mo. L. REv. 25, 50 (1985).
79. 354 U.S. at 250. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence posited an explicitly progressive
ideology that characterized the university by its "spirit of free inquiry, its ideal being the
ideal of Socrates . . . .This implies the right to examine, question, modify or reject tradi-
tional ideas and beliefs." Id. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting T.H. Huxley).
Justice Frankfurter was the principal advocate of academic freedom in the cases in which he
participated. See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 194 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
80. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). In Keyishian the Court invalidated on vagueness grounds a
New York loyalty oath requirement for university professors that required them to certify
that they were neither teaching "subversive ideas" nor members of any subversive group. In
contrast to the progressive ideological dicta in the majority opinion, Justice Clark's dissent-
ing opinion stressed the state's duty to screen teachers because they "shape[] the attitude of
young minds towards the society in which they live." Id. at 624 (Clark, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952)).
81. 385 U.S. at 603.
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with higher education's notion of academic freedom as the true
marketplace of ideas where students are exposed to diverse influ-
ences. Historically, the inculcation of values plays a much less im-
portant role in higher education. 2 This traditional dicotomy be-
tween primary and secondary public education and higher public
education results from the perceived goals of each level and the
differing characteristics of the pupils. Courts generally view high
school students as less mature than their university counterparts
and, therefore, less capable of coping with a progressive market-
place of ideas.83 Despite these differences, in the aftermath of the
Sweezy and Keyishian decisions, the Court soon began to apply
the progressive ideology to primary and secondary public
education.
2. Primary and Secondary Public Education: Adoption of the
Progressive Ideology
Although earlier opinions foreshadowed the adoption of the
progressive ideology for primary and secondary public education,84
the Court did not implicitly embrace this ideology until the 1968
decision of Tinker v. Des Moines School District.5 In Tinker a
82. See Goldstein, Reflections on Developing Trends in the Law of Student Rights,
118 U. PA. L. REV. 612, 614 (1970). The Court accepted the constitutional validity of inculca-
tion in lower public education in Barnette by contrasting the impermissible compulsory flag
salute statute with the valid means of "teaching by instruction and study" to achieve the
same end. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 631 (quoting with approval Minersville School Dist. v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604 (1940) (Stone, C.J., dissenting)).
83. The Court has relied on the assertedly greater impressionability and vulnerability
of secondary pupils, as compared to university students, to justify dissimilar treatment of
the two groups. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (relying on difference in
susceptibility to indoctrination between pupils at lower and higher levels to uphold govern-
mental grants to sectarian colleges while striking grants to sectarian lower schools).
Generally, the Court has identified and relied on the following characteristics of chil-
dren to conclude that children's constitutional rights are not coextensive with those of
adults: (1) "the peculiar vulnerability of children; [(2)] their inability to make critical deci-
sions in an informed, mature manner; and [(3)] the importance of the parental role in child
rearing." Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). The Court, however, is equally capable
of assuming away these differences when the decision at hand requires. See infra note 199.
Moreover, high school students are in many ways politically well-developed and capable of
handling sensitive subjects. See generally H. HYMAN, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION (1959); F.
GREENSTEIN, CHILDREN AND POLITICS (1969); R. HESS & J. TORNEY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN CHILDREN (1967).
84. In the loyalty oath cases the Court began to include dicta treating the interest of
teachers in free inquiry and debate at both the high school and college levels as identical.
See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
85. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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group of students and parents decided to publicize their objections
to the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands. The principals of
the Des Moines schools discovered the plan and adopted a policy
mandating suspension for any student continuing to wear an arm-
band after a request to remove it. The school suspended three stu-
dents for wearing the prohibited armbands; the students brought a
Section 1983 action seeking nominal damages and an injunction re-
straining school officials from enforcing their policy.
The Court concluded that the regulation unconstitutionally
denied the students' rights of expression."' The majority opinion"7
stated that teachers and students do not "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate"88 and cited many higher education precedents as authority.8 9
The Tinker Court, however, did not balance the speech interests
involved against an indoctrinative interest, sacrificing one to pro-
tect the other. Instead, the Court viewed the protection of student
speech as important because of its educational value.90 The Court
saw communication among students and the accompanying contro-
versy as an important aspect of the educational process worthy of
protection. This view implicitly endorsed John Dewey's progressiv-
ist philosophy of education, 91 which states that school authorities
should encourage students to participate in the learning process.92
Under the progressive ideology, conflict generated through stu-
dent-environment interaction is essential to continued growth.9
To this end, the Tinker Court enunciated a "noninterference prin-
ciple," allowing limitation of student expression only if the expres-
sion interfered significantly with the school's operation.9
86. According to Professor Diamond, one problem with the Tinker decision is that the
Court's acknowledgement of the constitutional rights of children was actually the end of its
analysis rather than a starting point upon which the Court could graft limitations. This
resulted in an undervaluation of the inculcative purposes behind the public school system.
Diamond, supra note 29, at 491, 498.
87. Justice Fortas' majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall. Justices White and Stewart each filed separate concurring
opinions and Justices Black and Harlan filed separate dissents.
88. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
89. See id. at 506-07.
90. See Note, supra note 64, at 531-32; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
91. Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 Tax. L. REv. 321, 340 (1979).
92. See J. DEwEY. supra note 41, at 41-53.
93. See Kohlberg & Mayer, supra note 18, at 454-55.
94. See Note, supra note 64, at 532. A student "may express his opinions . . . if he
does so without 'materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appro-
priate discipline in the operation of the school' and without colliding with the rights of
others." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.
1987]
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In implicitly applying Dewey's progressive ideology to primary
and secondary public education, the Court discounted both the in-
culcative interest of the state and the alleged immaturity of stu-
dents at the secondary educational level-factors that support a
disparate treatment between higher and lower public education.
The Tinker Court described the relationship between the student
and the state as reciprocal rather than inculcative,95 and as a rela-
tionship characterized by a robust exchange of ideas extending to
all aspects of the school environment 6 and serving both individual
students' interests and broader societal interests.9 7 By imposing no
age or maturity limitations on the exercise of student expression, 8
the majority assumed that all students may benefit from and con-
tribute to this exchange of ideas without also assuming that chil-
dren have a full capacity for individual choice.99 Furthermore, by
1966)). This principle would make little sense if the Tinker Court viewed the inculcation of
community values and beliefs as an important goal of education. Note, supra note 64, at
532.
95. "Students in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our Constitution.
They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they them-
selves must respect their obligations to the State. In our system, students may not be re-
garded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate."
393 U.S. at 511. This is suggestive of the dialectical process of learning under the progres-
sive ideology.
96. The Tinker Court stated:
"The principle of these cases [Meyer, Keyishian, and Shelton] is not confined to the
supervised and ordained discussion which takes place in the classroom.. . . A student's
rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafete-
ria. .. or on the campus during authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even
on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam .... .
Id. at 512. For the antithesis of this statement, see the discussion of Fraser, infra notes 169-
206 and accompanying text, in which the Court held that the inculcative mission of the
school extends beyond the classroom.
The plurality opinion in Board of Education v. Pico, 451 U.S. 853 (1982), represents a
compromise between these two positions. See infra notes 154-60 and accompanying text.
97. Exposure to diverse ideas and cognitive conflict encourages maximum individual
growth and also better prepares students for the problems they face as adults in a demo-
cratic society. See Keiter, supra note 78, at 51-52.
98. Although the petitioners in the Tinker case were children aged 13, 15, and 16 years
old, the Court was aware that students as young as 8 and 11 years old were involved in the
armband protest. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting).
99. Justice Stewart included the caveat that the state may, "at least in some precisely
delineated areas," deny children some first amendment rights because of their lack of full
capacity for individual choice. Id. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring)). This demonstrates that the
Court could prohibit school authorities from stopping the armband protest without also
stating that children have this full capacity. See Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New
Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their Rights, 1976 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 605, 645. Therefore, the immaturity of secondary school students lends little support
to the cultural transmission ideology at that level and may in fact be a justification for
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imposing the noninterference principle and accepting the value of
maximum student discourse, the majority implicitly rejected disci-
pline in and of itself as one of the goals of education.100
This rejection of discipline particularly bothered Justice Black
who, in dissent, disagreed with the majority's discussion of every
issue in the case, fearing the decision transferred control of the
public schools from elected officials to the Supreme Court.' 10 Jus-
tice Black espoused the cultural transmission theory implemented
through local control. According to Justice Black, student speech
played no role in the educational process'0 2 because that process
consisted of the passive intake of knowledge by immature chil-
dren. 10 3 Student speech simply distracted from the true learning
process; therefore, local school authorities should have the power
to determine the scope of student speech rights. 04 Justice Black
argued that learning discipline is an important part of a child's
education. 05 Moreover, he realized that any implicit rejection of
the discipline goal might lead to the corollary decision that stu-
dents are capable of self-governance. 06
restrictions on government inculcation (i.e., government speech). Cf. Shiffrin, supra note 32,
at 647 (arguing that academic freedom should be strongest at lower educational levels);
Yudof, supra note 32, at 874-82 (proposing dispersal of the power over curriculum).
100. Berkman, Students in Court: Free Speech and the Functions of Schooling in
America, 40 HARV. EDUc. REV. 567, 580-81 (1970); Garvey, supra note 91, at 340.
101. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515 (Black, J., dissenting).
102. "[Plublic schools. . . are operated to give students an opportunity to learn, not
to talk politics by actual speech, or by 'symbolic' speech." Id. at 523-24 (Black, J., dissent-
ing). Under Justice Black's view "learning" and student speech are mutually exclusive.
103. Justice Black stated that children are not sent to school to state their views be-
cause they have "not yet reached the point of experience and wisdom which [would enable]
them to teach all of their elders. . . . [T]axpayers send children to school on the premise
that at their age they need to learn, not teach." Id. at 522.
Under the majority's progressive ideology, the speech activities of students are not valu-
able because they enlighten the public or educate adults; instead, student speech and stu-
dent-environment interaction are valuable because they aid students in developing their
own formatioins of opinion and belief and expose them to the more sophisticated ideas of
students at higher developmental stages, thereby stimulating their own ascention to those
levels. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
The majority in Fraser later recognized the effects of this interaction between more
sophisticated older students and younger ones from an inculcative perspective. Older stu-
dents serve as role models, which means that their speech should be strictly controlled to
ensure inculcation of the proper behavior in younger students. See infra notes 192-93 and
accompanying text.
104. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524 (Black, J., dissenting).
105. Justice Black maintained: "School discipline, like parental discipline, is an inte-
gral and important part of training our children to be good citizens-to be better citizens."
Id.
106. "1 wish. . . wholly to disclaim any purpose on my part to hold that the Federal
Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender control
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:939
Justice Harlan's dissent in Tinker also focused on the need for
discipline to answer the broader questions of the Court's role in
reviewing the decisions of school officials, the first amendment
rights of schoolchildren, and the value of student contribution to
the educational process. Justice Harlan would allow school officials
great discretion to maintain discipline and would place the burden
on complaining parties to demonstrate that a particular action by
those officials was "motivated by other than legitimate school con-
cerns."'107 The Court later adopted, in its retreat from Tinker, the
Tinker dissenters' emphasis on discipline as a goal of education
and their deferential standard of review.10 8
The Tinker Court's implicit adoption of the progressive ideol-
ogy'0 and its imposition of the substantial disruption requirement
struck a realistic balance between indoctrinative and individualis-
tic interests in the school environment. By preserving the rights of
students to express their views on controversial subjects, the Court
ensured an interactive school environment with an appropriate
amount of conflict and discussion. 10 The Tinker Court banned
government suppression of student expression because interaction
among students, as long as no disruption results, is part of the edu-
of the American public school system to public school students." Id. at 526. The implicit
assertion in Tinker that students are self-governing undermines the immaturity of children
as a rationale for the disparate treatment between students in higher and secondary public
education.
107. Id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Nonlegitimate motivations include "a desire to
prohibit the expression of an unpopular point of view, while permitting expression of the
dominant opinion." Id. Justice Harlan's dissent exemplified the deferential stance tradition-
ally taken by the Court to review local school decisions under a standard of reasonableness
in light of educational purposes. Tinker, however, implies that these decisions must now
satisfy national constitutional standards. Diamond, supra note 29, at 500.
108. See infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
109. But cf. Freeman, The Supreme Court and First Amendment Rights of Students
in the Public School Classroom: A Proposed Model of Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1,
12-13 (1984). Freeman states that, dicta to the contrary aside, the Tinker majority protected
only speech that did not affect classroom activity. Therefore, "[if the speech becomes con-
troversial and initiates debate in the classroom [as would be expected under a marketplace
of ideas model], it loses its First Amendment protection." Id. at 12.
Justice Fortas' opinion, however, emphasized student interaction and expression as a
component of the educational process and allowed such expression maximum flexibility by
tying its denial to a physical disruption standard, see Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09 (citing
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)), rather than tying it to a diversion standard as
advocated by Justice Black, see 393 U.S. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting). Although a "pure"
progressive ideology would require total freedom of inquiry in the classroom and, therefore,
exceed the rights identified in Tinker, such a directionless "palm-tree" system of education
is neither practical nor desirable. See J. DEWEY, supra note 41, at 23-40.
110. Under the progressive ideology such conflict is essential for growth. See Kohlberg
& Mayer, supra note 18, at 454.
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cational process and enhances the growth potential of students.111
The Court, however, did not abandon local control" 2 and inculca-
tive interests altogether; the state's power to prescribe the curricu-
lum and hire teachers remained intact. Tinker accepted the pro-
gressive ideology, with the caveat of limited curricular value
inculcation, 13 and laid down a bright-line progressive model for
public education from which the Court has steadily retreated.""
C. The Retreat from Tinker to a "Rough Accommodation"
Between Inculcation and Individualism: Goss, Ambach, Plyler,
and Pico
1. Goss' Split of Opinion
Within three years of the 1969 Tinker decision, four seats on
the Court changed.1 5 As a result of these changes, the Court's atti-
tude began to shift from progressivism to cultural transmission.
The five to four decision in Goss v. Lopez" 6 demonstrated the
court's sharp division over the proper role of education in
society. 117
In Goss the Court extended due process protections to school
suspension decisions and implicitly endorsed the participatory
rights of students."18 Students' constitutional rights could not be
denied, according to the majority, absent due process protections
111. No justification exists, other than the contribution of free speech to the child's
development and growth, for the Court's recognition of children's greater free speech rights.
Garvey, supra note 91, at 338.
112. But see Diamond, supra note 29, at 507.
113. See Freeman, supra note 109, at 14.
114. See infra notes 115-206 and accompanying text; see also Diamond, supra note 29,
at 525.
115. Justice Burger replaced Chief Justice Warren, Justice Powell replaced Justice
Black, Justice Blackmun replaced Justice Fortas, and Justice Rehnquist replaced Justice
Harlan.
116. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
117. Chief Justice Warren was a member of the Tinker majority while his replace-
ment, Chief Justice Burger, was among the dissenters in Goss who advocated a cultural
transmission ideology; Justice Fortas was the author of the Tinker majority opinion while
his successor, Justice Blackmun, also joined the dissenters in Goss. Justice Black's replace-
ment by Justice Powell and Justice Harlan's replacement by Justice Rehnquist did not
bring new stances on education to the Court because the successors dissented in Goss as
their predecessors had dissented in Tinker.
118. Goss was a class action suit brought by a number of Columbus, Ohio public
school students for review of their suspensions imposed under an Ohio statute that permit-
ted student suspensions for misconduct for up to 10 days without a hearing. The students
claimed that their suspensions without hearings violated due process. Goss, 419 U.S. at 567.
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such as prior notice and opportunity for a hearing.119 The majority
opinion did not address directly the role of education, but upheld
the interactive rights of students and endorsed the belief that
truth best will be discovered if the student is given an opportunity
to meet the charges. 120 Thus, the Goss majority adhered to the pro-
gressive interactional process of education by refusing to stress the
inculcative nature of public education.
Unlike the majority, Justice Powell's dissent, which was joined
by three other Justices,' 21 did not "analogize" the rights of minors
to those of adults. 122 Instead, the dissent emphasized cultural
transmission 123 to support its position that students were not enti-
tled to a hearing. Justice Powell, once a school board member him-
self, 24 placed great weight on the benefits of local control and the
traditionally inculcative nature of public education. 125 For Justice
Powell, who saw teaching obedience to students as a meaningful
part of the educational process, 26 the individual student's interest
and need for discipline justified greater restraint on student rights.
Regardless of his justifications, Justice Powell's opinion repre-
119. Notwithstanding the fact that public education is not constitutionally mandated,
Justice White's majority opinion stated that a statutory grant of a right to public education
is a protected "property" interest under the due process clause. Due process, therefore, must
be observed whenever a school suspends a student for whatever reason. Id. at b74.
120. Id. at 580.
121. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined Justice Pow-
ell's opinion.
122. Goss, 419 U.S. at 591 (Powell, J., dissenting). The constitutional status of minors
is linked closely to the Court's view of the role of education in society and, in fact, may be
an antecedent question. If the Court sees minors as autonomous and sufficiently mature to
handle significant responsibility, the school environment can be less inculcative. Conversely,
if the Court sees children as incompetent and in need of protection, their rights can be
greatly circumscribed in a highly inculcative educational environment. Justice Stewart
raised this question in his Tinker concurrence. 393 U.S. at 514-15 (Stewart, J., concurring).
See generally Hafen, supra note 99, at 605.
123. See supra notes 19-34 and accompanying text.
124. Justice Powell served as president of both the Richmond School Board and the
State Board of Education of Virginia during the period when Virginia was undergoing de-
segregation. Urofsky, Mr. Justice Powell and Education: The Balancing of Competing Val-
ues, 13 J.L. & EDuc. 581, 582 (1984).
125. Justice Powell consistently has stressed value inculcation as the primary goal of
education. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 896 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting);
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 236-41 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring); Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68, 80-81 (1979); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 593 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
126. Goss, 419 U.S. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell stated:
The lesson of discipline is not merely a matter of the student's self-interest in the
shaping of his own character and personality. It provides an early understanding of the
relevance to the social compact of respect for the rights of others. The classroom is the
laboratory in which this lesson of life is best learned.
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sented a renewed adherence by four members of the Court to a
cultural transmission theory of education, 2 7 at least when student
speech rights were not involved directly and the students were still
in high school.1 28 The Goss five to four split began a retreat from
127. Three of the four Goss dissenters, Justices Powell, Burger, and Rehnquist, con-
tinued to uphold the cultural transmission ideology through their dissents in Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979), and Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), and their
membership in the Fraser majority. See infra notes 179-203 and accompanying text.
Although this Note examines the Court's attitude toward education, the cases used to
demonstrate this attitude implicate different constitutional interests that might influence
the Court to find one way or the other regardless of the educational ideology most support-
ive of a particular decision. The dicta concerning the proper role of education may change
with the issues presented in the underlying case. For example, Tinker concerned the expres-
sive rights of children supported by parental authority in circumstances that did not
threaten the state's interest in classroom inculcation. This situation allowed Justice Fortas
to emphasize the progressive aspects of the case. See Freeman, supra note 109, at 12-13. On
the other hand, Ambach concerned primarily the state's ability to select those through
whom it would inculcate children and did not present an issue of suppression of ideas or
student expression. These facts enabled Justice Powell to include a fair amount of dicta
concerning the importance of inculcation. See infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
The facts of the recent Fraser case raise two issues simultaneously: the speech interest
of a student and the exposure of a minor to indecent or profane language. Thus, the Court's
emphasis on inculcation simply could be a response to this situation involving indecent ma-
terial. The Court in Fraser, however, appeared to have gone beyond the necessary rationale
for the decision and intentionally commented on the indoctrinative nature of education as a
rationale for its decision. See infra notes 179-203 and accompanying text.
128. While adopting primarily a cultural transmission ideology at the secondary level,
Justice Powell at the same time adhered to a progressive ideology for higher public educa-
tion, as did the Court as a whole. In his majority opinion in Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169
(1972), Justice Powell refused to allow a college to deny recognition to a student organiza-
tion when that decision was based solely upon a disagreement with the group's philosophy
and an unsupported fear of disruption. Justice Powell stated that "[t]he college classroom
with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas,' and we break no new
constitutional ground in reaffirming this Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic free-
dom." Id. at 180-81 (citing Keyishian and Sweezy).
Justice Douglas joined the majority in Healy but wrote a separate opinion that upheld a
progressive model for higher education and lamented the placid life of college campuses as
indicative of the "sickness of our academic world." Id. at 197 (Douglas, J., joining opinion of
the Court). He rejected the traditional concept of education that "conceive[s] of the minds
of students as receptacles for the information which the faculty have garnered over the
years.. . .[where] [e]ducation is commonly thought of as the process of filling the recepta-
cles with what the faculty in its wisdom deems fit and proper." Id. at 196.
The Healy Court's critique of higher education as "placid" supports the notion that the
cultural transmission ideology should not be a basis for the Court's decisions at the second-
ary level. Children who are subjected to heavy value inculcation and associationist learning
in an unchallenging atmosphere at the secondary level will not suddenly challenge their
professors and stir up controversy upon reaching college. Furthermore, students who were
not encouraged to articulate their views on controversial subjects at the secondary level will
have little to say when they reach college and actually engage in the marketplace of ideas. If
academic inquiry at the level of higher education is to be productive, the secondary school
needs to provide the student with tools to take advantage of higher education's
"marketplace."
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the progressive ideology that characterized the Court's Tinker
opinion.
2. Ambach and Plyler Embrace Inculcation
In Ambach v. Norwick,129 an equal protection case, the Court
explicitly embraced the value-laden nature of public school educa-
tion under the cultural transmission ideology. Justice Powell's ma-
jority opinion stressed the inculcative nature of public education as
a ground for upholding a New York education law forbidding certi-
fication of a public schoolteacher who had not manifested an in-
tent to apply for citizenship.1 3 0 Justice Powell found that public
schools prepare individuals for participation as citizens and pre-
serve societal values.1 31 He neglected to mention, however, any
self-fulfillment or growth-enhancing functions of education beyond
those necessary to effectuate preparation for participation in dem-
ocratic society. Furthermore, according to Justice Powell, numer-
ous "authorities" have found public schools to be an "assimilative
force, 1 32 bringing together diverse elements of society. 3 Justice
Powell relied on social scientists to confirm this recognition of the
inculcative functions of public schools.
134
129. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
130. This equal protection challenge to the citizenship requirement for teachers
hinged upon whether the job of a public schoolteacher came within the "governmental func-
tion" principle. Under this principle, the state may impose a citizenship requirement on
persons carrying out a governmental function only if a rational relationship exists between
the requirement and a legitimate state interest. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647
(1973) (holding citizenship requirement appropriate to positions that "go to the heart of
representative government"); see also Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978). Previ-
ously, the Court had held classifications based on alienage inherently suspect and subject to
close judicial scrutiny. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). Justice Powell
looked to the role of public education to determine whether teaching constituted a govern-
mental function. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 75.
131. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 76.
132. Id. at 77. Contrast this with the language of Tinker. "[Sitate-operated schools
may not be enclaves of totalitarianism.. . . [SItudents may not be regarded as closed-circuit
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate .... [T]his Nation [has
repudiated] the principle that a State might so conduct its schools as to 'foster a homogene-
ous people.'" 393 U.S. at 511 (citations omitted).
133. In support of this proposition Justice Powell cited John Dewey's Democracy and
Education. Dewey recognized the need for a directive force in education in order to ensure
the active participation and cognitive development of the student. Dewey, however, advo-
cated only a guiding force to ensure growth, not an inculcative force to promote association-
ist learning. See J. DEWEY, supra note 41, at 49-53; cf. Kohlberg & Mayer, supra note 18, at
472-476 (stating progressive ideology is nonindoctrinative).
134. For a discussion of the social science data relied upon by the majority to support
the role of political socialization and inculcation in the public schools, see Note, Aliens'
Right to Teach: Political Socialization and the Public Schools, 85 YALE L. J. 90 (1975).
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Teachers transmit fundamental values and influence attitudes
of children toward government, falling within the governmental
function of an inculcative system of education. Therefore, accord-
ing to Justice Powell, the state legitimately could exclude nonci-
tizens from serving as teachers/role models because they are not
members in the franchise. Although commentators differ over the
significance of Justice Powell's emphasis on inculcation and cul-
tural transmission in Ambach,135 none of the Justices in the deci-
sion expressed any doubt that education should serve to inculcate
citizenship values. 36
In Plyler v. Doe,13 7 another equal protection case, the Court
invalidated a Texas law denying free public education to children
of illegal aliens.'38 The Plyler plurality opinion echoed much of the
Ambach language in which the Court characterized schools as a
"socializing institution"'3 9 for "transmitting 'the values on which
our society rests.' ",140 Political socialization through education was
so important to the Plyler Court that the popular majority could
not deny its value.1
4 '
Ambach and Plyler are the Court's most enthusiastic accept-
ances of state indoctrinative goals; neither decision, however,
presented questions of direct inculcation of values or beliefs under
the cultural transmission ideology. Ambach did not concern direct
suppression of student ideas or expression and may be viewed as
upholding the right of the state to select those persons it feels best
advocate citizenship values while leaving the progressive educa-
tional process intact.142 Similarly, Plyler simply upheld the right of
illegal alien children to attend school. Notwithstanding these possi-
ble limitations, the Court specifically embraced the methodology of
135. Professor Diamond categorizes Ambach as an endorsement by the Court of an all-
encompassing inculcative role of education, "cast[ing] serious doubt on the appropriateness
of extending Tinker beyond its facts." Diamond, supra note 29, at 528. In contrast, the
author of a student note sees Ambach as an acceptance of only those indoctrinative goals
that are "general . . . system-supporting . . . [and] consistent with the self-government
ideal" and, therefore, not inconsistent with Tinker. Note, supra note 64, at 524.
136. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 85-86 & n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
137. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
138. Id. at 230.
139. Id. at 222 n.20.
140. Id. at 221 (quoting Ambach, 441 U.S. at 76).
141. See Note, supra note 64, at 524-25. Although accused of applying a "quasi-funda-
mental-rights" analysis by the dissent, see 457 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), Justice
Brennan and the plurality firmly denied that public education was a fundamental right. Id.
at 221 (citing San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1933)).
142. Cf. Note, supra note 64, at 524 n.95 (advocating a citizenship requirement but
deploring ideological tests for teachers because of benefits from diversity).
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"inculcation," which is the trademark of cultural transmission.
Furthermore, the Court's emphasis on the teacher as a role
model143 implies that students should not be taught by noncitizens
because children learn by example and association rather than by
open presentation of conflicting viewpoints and ideas.
3. Pico's Rough Accommodation
In Board of Education v. Pico"" the Court faced, for the first
time since Tinker, the question of direct inculcation and suppres-
sion of ideas in the public school environment. The Pico decision
illustrates the Court's disagreement over the proper role of educa-
tion145 and its pre-Fraser rough accommodation between individu-
alistic and indoctrinative aspects of education. In Pico, five New
York high school students challenged a suburban New York school
board's decision to remove certain "objectionable" books from its
schools' libraries.146 The Court's opinion reflects the divergence of
opinion on this issue in the lower court decisions. 4 7 The Pico case
143. The Court again employs the concept of the role model in the Fraser case as a
justification for greater restrictions on the speech of older students. See infra notes 192-93
and accompanying text.
144. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
145. The Tinker decision spawned an avalanche of first amendment student rights
suits whose reasoning demonstrated the lower courts' inability to develop a coherent ana-
lytical framework as well. See Note, supra note 64, at 498 n.7.
146. Three school board members obtained lists of books described as "objectionable"
and "improper fare for students" at a conference sponsored by a politically conservative
organization. Acting on the advice of these members, the board directed that school libraries
remove and deliver any listed books to the board for review. Nine books were removed from
a high school library, one from a junior high library, and one from the curriculum of a
twelfth grade literature class. Pico, 457 U.S. at 856 & n.3. The board justified its decision to
remove "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-sem[iltic, and just plain filthy" books based on
its duty to protect the children from "this moral danger." Id. at 857. After appointing a
book review committee whose recommendations were largely ignored, the board returned
only one book to the high school library without restriction.
147. The district court opinion, Pico v. Board of Education, 474 F. Supp. 387
(E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), stressed the
primarily indoctrinative role of public education and the impropriety of judicial interven-
tion infringing on the elected school board's discretion. 474 F. Supp. at 396. The court found
that the school board's action "did not sharply and directly implicate basic first amendment
values." Id. at 398.
This language derives from Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), in which the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional an Arkansas statute that forbade the teaching of
evolution in public schools and colleges. The Court, per Justice Fortas (the author of the
Tinker majority opinion), stated that courts should intervene in the daily conflicts of public
education only when basic constitutional values are directly involved because "public educa-
tion in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities." Id. at 104. The
Court recognized, however, the importance of "vigilant protection of constitutional free-
doms" in the public schools, but declined to enter the "difficult terrain" of Meyer and re-
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presented two state interests that conflicted with the first amend-
ment rights of students under the progressive ideology: (1) the in-
culcative interest of public educators and the school board's proper
role in determining which values will be part of the curriculum;
and (2) the school authority's interest in protecting children from
vulgar and indecent-and therefore educationally worth-
less-materials.14 As evidenced by the six opinions in the case,14 9
and the fact that the prevailing side in Pico won by a single vote
with no majority opinion,150 the Court itself was unable to define
the scope of state indoctrinative powers.
51
Notwithstanding this confusion and the Justices' differing per-
ceptions of public education, every Justice implicitly adopted, in
varying degrees, the cultural transmission ideology. 52 The differ-
lated cases because the Court resolved the case on establishment clause grounds. Id. at 104-
05 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
In contrast, the court of appeals split two to one in Pico. Judge Sifton, writing for the
court, found the school board's actions suspiciously irregular, indicating the possibility that
board members had acted to suppress free speech. 638 F.2d at 417-18. Judge Newman con-
curred in the result because he determined a trial was necessary to resolve the factual ques-
tion of the school board's motives for the removal decision. Id. at 436-37 (Newman, J., con-
curring). Judge Mansfield dissented, confidently stating that the board removed the books
because of their vulgar and sexually explicit contents. Id. at 427-29 (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting).
148. For a discussion of minors' exposure to indecent material, see infra note 165.
149. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Blackmun, White, Powell, and Rehn-
quist all filed separate opinions. Justice O'Connor wrote a separate two paragraph opinion
in which she joined the Chief Justice's dissent.
150. Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion and was joined by Justices Marshall
and Stevens. Justice Blackmun filed a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment. Justice White also filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
151. One commentator stated that "the Supreme Court had the opportunity to adopt
the . . . view that freedom of expression imposes substantive constitutional limitations on
the public schools' inculcative function. Unfortunately, it failed to do so." Gordon, supra
note 17, at 576.
152. Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, stated "that public schools are vitally
important... as vehicles for 'inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance
of a democratic political system.'" 457 U.S. at 864 (quoting Ambach, 441 U.S. at 76-77).
Justice Blackmun stated in his concurrence that "[i]t . . . seems entirely appropriate that
the State use 'public schools [to] . . . inculcat[e] fundamental values necessary to the main-
tenance of a democratic political system.'" Id. at 876 (Blackmun, J., concurring)(quoting
Ambach, 441 U.S. at 77). Chief Justice Burger asked the question "[hlow are 'fundamental
values' to be inculcated except by having school boards make content-based decisions about
the appropriateness of retaining materials in the school library and curriculum[?]" Id. at
889 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Powell emphasized local control in objecting to the
plurality's acceptance of inculcation and "[y]et when a school board, as in this case, takes its
responsibilities seriously and seeks to decide what the fundamental values are that should
be imparted, the plurality finds a constitutional violation." Id. at 896 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing). Finally, Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, drew a distinction between the government
acting as an educator and the government acting as a sovereign: "When it acts as an educa-
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ences in opinion arose over the scope and means of defining the
state indoctrinative interest. This adoption of value inculcation be-
came more explicit and all encompassing in the Fraser opinion. 153
The plurality created a dilemma from which it extricated itself
only by reaching a tortured accommodation between cultural
transmission and progressivism. The plurality recognized both a
broad right of the school to inculcate values"" and an equally
broad individualistic interest in free inquiry referred to as the
"right to receive information and ideas."' 55 To resolve this conflict,
the plurality posited that the school library serves a different edu-
cational goal than the rest of the school. 56 Although the school
board "might well defend their claim of absolute discretion in mat-
ters of curriculum by reliance on their duty to inculcate commu-
nity values,' 157 the library, as a place for the student "to test or
expand upon ideas presented to him, in or out of the classroom,'
58
serves a unique role as "the principal locus of . . .freedom ...
tor, at least at the elementary and secondary school level, the government is engaged in
inculcating social values and knowledge .... Id. at 909 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
153. See infra notes 179-93 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 103.
155. Pico, 457 U.S. at 867 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)). The
Court first recognized the "right to receive information and ideas" outside the educational
field and then developed it to protect the flow of knowledge and ideas to recipients of com-
munications. See M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.09[B] (student ed. 1984);
Recent Development, Removal of Public School Library Books: The First Amendment Ver-
sus the Local School Board, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1412-15 (1981); see also Emerson, Legal
Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1.
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Pico argued that this right to receive ideas is
particularly applicable to the school environment because access to ideas "prepares students
for active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often contentious society in which
they will soon be adult members." 457 U.S. at 868.
156. See generally Note, supra note 64, at 510-11 (identifying plurality's "difficult
position").
157. Pico, 457 U.S. at 869 (emphasis in original). But cf. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512
(quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603) (public school classroom is "marketplace of ideas").
Brennan was careful to limit the breadth of the Pico decision by specifically excluding
inquiry into the school board's discretion to prescribe the curriculum, the school's control of
the classroom and compulsory courses, and any decisions involving the acquisition of books.
Pico, 457 U.S. at 862. Although preserving the progressive ideology in the library, Justice
Brennan's opinion does not curtail the extensive inculcation occurring in all other areas of
the school environment. See Note, supra note 64, at 511. The principles articulated in the
Pico plurality opinion are not limited to book removal and Justice Brennan's distinction
between removal and acquisition has been criticized. See, e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. at 916 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); Diamond, supra note 29, at 524. Moreover, it is difficult to accept the
proposition that the school's relationship to the student changes simply because the student
enters the library.
158. 457 U.S. at 869 (quoting Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F.
Supp. 703, 715 (D. Mass. 1978)).
966
EDUCATIONAL IDEOLOGY
and the regime of voluntary inquiry that there holds sway." '159 The
plurality, therefore, split the school environment into distinct areas
of cultural transmission and progressivism.
According to the plurality, the library's nonindoctrinative role
dictated that the school board could not remove books with the
intent to limit student access to information and ideas. The valid-
ity of book removal decisions, therefore, turned on the board's mo-
tivation. If the board removed the books solely because of perva-
sively vulgar content or educational unsuitability, removal would
be permissible. If, however, the school board removed the books to
"prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion,"' 60 their actions would violate the stu-
dents' first amendment rights. The plurality remanded the case be-
cause the evidence did not indicate the board's motivation for
removal.
While the plurality, at least concerning the school library, pro-
tected the pure progressive ideology with its "right to receive," the
dissenting Justices implicitly rejected this model and sought to de-
fine the outermost limits of permissible state indoctrination under
the cultural transmission ideology. In his dissent, Chief Justice
Burger articulated a fear that any recognition of a "right to receive
ideas" would allow children and the federal courts to determine
the content of education rather than parents and teachers acting
through the politically accountable school board. 16 1 The only situa-
159. Id. at 868-69. Justice Brennan tied the library to first amendment concerns using
the rationale of student access to information and ideas. Accord Brown v. Louisiana, 383
U.S. 131 (1966).
160. Pico, 457 U.S. at 872 (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943)).
161. Traditionally, the Court has been hesitant to intervene in educational disputes
because it viewed the educational process as a local matter. The cultural transmission ideol-
ogy supports this position and its corollary that if values and beliefs are to be inculcated,
the appropriate body to carry out this function is the local school board. Therefore, the
aggrieved student or parent should challenge unacceptable policies through the local politi-
cal process rather than in the federal courts. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
104 (1968); cf. Keiter, supra note 78, at 55 (positing judicial nonintervention primarily upon
cultural transmission ideology).
The assumption that school boards are truly representative of community values and
are politically accountable to the community at large is questionable given the low voter
turnout at most elections, the disproportionate influence of affluent voters and interest
groups, and the low level of knowledge about educational matters in the community at large.
See F. WIRT & M. KIRsT, THE POLITICAL WEB OF AMERICAN SCHOOLS (1972); L. ZEIGLER & M.
JENNINGS, GOVERNING AMERICAN SCHOOLS: POLITICAL INTERACTION IN LocAL SCHOOL Dis-
TRICTS (1974); Mann, Participation, Representation and Control, in THE POLITICS OF EDU-
CATION 74 (J. Scribner ed. 1977).
Further undermining the legitimacy of local control as a justification for judicial nonin-
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tion in which Chief Justice Burger limited the school board's dis-
cretion in choosing values to transmit is an action by the board
that places "direct external control on the students' ability to ex-
press themselves. 16 2 According to Justice Powell, the Pico decision
would invite student challenges to educational decisions, result in
further judicial intrusion into the operation of schools, and under-
mine schools as the primary vehicles for transmitting social val-
ues.163 Justice Rehnquist articulated his acceptance of cultural
transmission by characterizing any right of access as "contrary to
tervention under the cultural transmission theory is the increasing state and federal involve-
ment in educational matters traditionally handled at the local level. Keiter, supra note 78,
at 57-58.
162. Pico, 457 U.S. at 886. The distinction Chief Justice Burger draws between direct
suppression of student expression and refusal to convey information ignores the importance
of access to ideas in the formation of belief and expression. Chief Justice Burger's position
appears to allow the school board effectively to foreclose any meaningful student expression
or discussion of controversial subjects by simply not providing the students with the infor-
mation necessary to stimulate or conduct such discussion. The board could indirectly
achieve the suppression of student expression by removing the "ammunition of dis-
course"--information and ideas. Cf. Gordon, supra note 17, at 540 (arguing that
"[glovernment's decision to halt access to information and ideas with which it disagrees
implicitly imposes its own understanding of reality on children just as surely as does explicit
communication of the government's point of view").
In response to this problem a number of commentators have called for an expansion of
first amendment theory to cover the formation of belief as well as its expression. See, e.g., T.
EMERSON. THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 3, 21 (1970) (stating that the present day
concept of free expression includes the "right to form and hold beliefs and opinions"); Arons
& Lawrence, supra note 14, at 312; cf. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute,
1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 255-57 (emphasizing the importance of protecting the formation of
belief).
Chief Justice Burger later abandons this dicotomy between impermissible inculcation
through direct suppression of expression and acceptable inculcation through denial of access
in his majority opinion in Fraser when the expressive rights of a student are also at issue.
See infra note 185.
163. 457 U.S. at 896 (Powell, J., dissenting). But cf. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641 (stating
that "[p]robably no deeper division of our people could proceed from any provocation than
from finding it necessary to choose what doctrine and whose program public educational
officials shall compel youth to unite in embracing").
Although the context of Pico was the removal of library books and not, as in Barnette,
compulsion to adopt a particular belief, Justice Powell and the other dissenter's strong en-
dorsements of local control and cultural transmission overlook the use of the books as a foil
for values that the school should encourage by persuasion and example rather than by sup-
pression of ideas. Under a progressive ideology the presentation of genuine value conflict
results in growth of the child; therefore, exposure should not be restricted. Cf. Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating that "if there be time
to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence"). But cf. Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (justifying limitation on
speech because children are a captive audience); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
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the very nature of an inculcative education. "164
In contrast to the majority's application of the progressive ide-
ology in the school library and the dissenting Justices' endorse-
ment of the cultural transmission ideology, Justice Blackmun at-
tempted to achieve a rough accommodation between ideologies by
refusing to accept either total inculcation or complete freedom of
inquiry. He recognized, and attempted to reconcile, the tension be-
tween legitimate socializing functions of education and the first
amendment's bar against "prescriptions of orthodoxy."
According to Justice Blackmun, Pico set forth the narrow
principle that school officials should be allowed to make a choice
between books for "a host of other politically neutral reasons," in-
cluding offensive language.1 5 School officials, however, are prohib-
164. Pico, 457 U.S. at 914-915 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 880 (Blackmun, J., concurring). All members of the Pico Court acknowl-
edged the school board's authority to remove books that are vulgar. Id. at 871-72 (plurality
opinion); id. at 918-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
In contrast to the Meyer-Tinker line of cases extending constitutional protection to
minors in the exercise of their first amendment rights stands a line of cases dating back to
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), and including Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629 (1968), FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), and New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747 (1982), in which the Court was disinclined to extend such constitutional protection.
In this line of cases the Court gave greater weight to the Bellotti factors, see supra note 83,
the state's interest in educating its future citizens, and the rights of parents to control the
communications their children receive.
Particularly in the area of obscene or vulgar communications the Court has upheld the
states' efforts to regulate children's access to such materials. In Ginsberg the Court upheld a
New York statute forbidding the sale to children under 17 of "girlie" magazines that were
not obscene for adults. The Court approved a variable standard of obscenity for children
based on the state's independent interest in assuring the growth of children into well-devel-
oped, productive citizens and parental efforts to ensure the child's well-being. 390 U.S. at
640, 639. Using these factors, the Court concluded that it was reasonable for the state to
adopt a lower standard of obscenity for children who are less able to "determine for them-
selves what sex material they may read or see." Id. at 637.
More recently, the Pacifica Court upheld a restrictive regulation of vulgar speech likely
to reach children. The Pacifica Court held that the FCC could impose sanctions on a radio
broadcaster who transmitted George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue on the radio one
afternoon. The Court's two-fold rationale was that broadcasting seriously intrudes upon the
privacy of the home and routinely reaches impressionable young children. 438 U.S. at 748-
49. Notwithstanding the fact that the language involved was not obscene, id. at 742, the
Court rejected the defendant's argument that the first amendment protected the right to
broadcast this material and based its decision in part upon concern for the possible presence
of children in the audience. Id. at 749-50. The Court reiterated the government's interest in
protecting the welfare of children and the government's ability to regulate speech directed
toward children under the more flexible Ginsberg standard. Id.
The Ginsberg line of cases, however, does not undercut the rationale of Tinker and its
progeny. Because obscene material has no social value for adults and, therefore, is not enti-
tled to first amendment protection, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26, 36 (1973), the
Court correspondingly can treat it as having no value for children either. Vulgar or profane
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ited from denying access to books "for the purpose of restricting
access to the political ideas or social perspectives discussed in
them, when that action is motivated simply by the officials' disap-
proval of the ideas involved.' 6 6 Justice Blackmun used Barnette
to distinguish between teaching by example and its antithesis,
which is "an intentional attempt to shield students from certain
ideas that officials find politically distasteful.' 16 7 Thus, Justice
Blackmun attempted to harmonize the cultural transmission and
progressive ideologies in an analysis applicable to the entire school
environment.
In Pico the Court struggled to reconcile the cultural transmis-
sion and progressive ideologies. Justice Brennan recognized a stu-
dent right to receive information in the progressive setting of the
school library. The dissenters emphasized the inculcative nature of
speech contributes little to a child's growth or potential for future contribution to society.
The Court, therefore, can restrict such speech consistent with the progressivist and first
amendment concepts of growth and development. Keiter, supra note 78, at 43.
While Pico concerned books that arguably were vulgar, the Justices chose not to em-
phasize the Ginsberg line of cases in their reasoning. But ef. Keiter, supra note 78, at 45-46
(arguing that Pico achieved an accommodation between the Tinker and Ginsberg princi-
ples). Likewise, the majority in Fraser, rather than rely exclusively on the offensive nature
of the speech involved, built its analysis around cultural transmission and the inculcative
notion of education. Fraser, however, expands this inculcative presence considerably. See
infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, the Court has employed the first amendment's "captive audience" doc-
trine in these situations involving minors and obscene or vulgar speech. This doctrine em-
bodies the notion that the first amendment interests of the audience are implicated if they
are subjected to speech from which they are unable to escape. If the members of an audi-
ence are unwilling to be exposed to certain ideas or, in the case of children, are insufficiently
mature to cope with the ideas conveyed and cannot remove themselves, the enlightenment
function of free speech is vitiated. See M. NIMMER, supra note 155, § 1.02[F][2][a]. Compare
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1977) with Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298, 302-04 (1974) and Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting).
The Court has recognized that in some circumstances children may be a captive audi-
ence per se. See, e.g., Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 649-50 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that "at
least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a captive audience-is not
possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First
Amendment guarantees") (footnote omitted); see also Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 214 n.11 (1975). The Court has not attempted to define precisely when children are a
captive audience, but the Court's decisions appear to limit its application to sexually ex-
plicit speech. M. NIMMER, supra note 155, § 1.02[F][2][g]. See generally id. § 1.02[F][2][a]-
[g].
Even though Fraser concerned a speech given to a high school assembly, the Court
placed little emphasis on either the captive audience doctrine or the vulgarity of the re-
marks and relied primarily on the role of education to justify its decision. See infra note 197
and accompanying text.
166. 457 U.S. at 879-880 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
167. Id. at 882.
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education limited only by Tinker's prohibition against direct sup-
pression of nondisruptive student expression; and Justice Black-
mun, somewhere in between, advocated a synthesis of the two.
Against this background, the Court rendered its 1986 decision in
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser."8 The Fraser decision
marks a renewed emphasis on the cultural transmission ideology
and perhaps the end to the Court's limited acceptance of the pro-
gressive ideology.
IV. CULTURAL TRANSMISSION REVITALIZED: THE FRASER DECISION
Matthew Fraser, a high school student, delivered a speech at a
school assembly nominating a fellow classmate for a student elec-
tive office. Students at Fraser's high school were required either to
attend the assembly or to report to study hall. In the speech Fraser
referred to his candidate using an explicit sexual metaphor. 169 The
day after the assembly school officials notified Fraser that his
speech violated a high school disciplinary rule,1 70 suspended him




After unsuccessfully pursuing review of this disciplinary action
through the school's grievance procedures, Fraser brought a Sec-
tion 1983 action in the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Washington alleging that the school had violated his
first amendment rights. The district court, relying on Tinker's dis-
ruption standard, awarded Fraser damages, litigation costs, and
enjoined the school district from not allowing him to speak at the
graduation ceremonies.172 The United States Court of Appeals for
168. 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
169. Id. at 3162. The following is the entire text of Fraser's speech:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character is
firm-but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll
take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives hard,
pushing and pushing until finally-he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for each and every one
of you.
So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never come between you and the
best our high school can be.
106 S. Ct. at 3167 (Brennan, J., concurring).
170. The rule, prohibiting the use of obscene language in the school, provided: "Con-
duct which materially and substantially interferes with the educational process is prohib-
ited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures." Id. at 3162.
171. Id. at 3162.
172. Fraser v. Bethel School Dist., No. c83-306T (W.D. Wash. June 8, 1983), aff'd, 755
F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
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the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court in an opinion that fol-
lowed prior case law and reflected the Supreme Court's general at-
titude toward the role of education prior to the Court's retreat
from Tinker. The circuit court held that Fraser's speech was not
disruptive because the Tinker standard required a high threshold
before limitations could be imposed on student expression,173 not
merely "inappropriateness.' 1 74 The Ninth Circuit also found that
Fraser's speech was not part of the school curriculum under Pico's
rough accommodation between curricular activities and indepen-
dent inquiry.175 Finally, the circuit court did not extend the Gins-
berg and Pacifica considerations for indecent material in the
broadcasting context to limit Fraser's colorful remarks. 178 The dis-
sent, however, argued that several factors make the school environ-
ment unique for first amendment purposes.17 7 The Supreme Court
173. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
174. 755 F.2d at 1361. The dissent, on the other hand, stated that Tinker was inappli-
cable to Fraser's situation. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text. Although the Ninth Circuit
found the school district's reliance on Pico "puzzling," the school district may have been on
firmer ground than the court realized. In order to distinguish Pico, the circuit court made
the assumption that the student assembly was at least as removed from the classroom envi-
ronment as the school library. Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1364. This assertion is of dubious merit
given the difference between a student who voluntarily goes to the library to read a book
containing vulgar material and the student who attends an assembly without any warning of
a vulgar presentation. Unlike the library, the assembly also was a part of teaching the spe-
cific skills of rhetoric and leadership through the student government process and, therefore,
was closely akin to curricular material. See Note, Tinker Revisited: Fraser v. Bethel School
District and Regulation of Speech in the Public Schools, 1985 DuKE L.J. 1164, 1171 n.61,
1184.
The Supreme Court's analysis in Fraser rejected the Pico distinction and for the first
time stated that the state's inculcative function extends to all aspects of the school environ-
ment. See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 165.
177. Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1367 (Wright, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Wright
accused the majority of misapplying the Tinker standard in the context of indecent expres-
sion and ignoring the factors that make the school environment unique for first amendment
purposes. He noted that the majority did not take the following into account: (1) the "physi-
cally confining nature of schools" that effectively makes the children a captive audience; (2)
the limited nature of minors' rights and the school's role acting in loco parentis; (3) the
greater limitations that may be imposed on obscene or indecent communications directed at
children; and (4) the special inculcative function of schools in society and the expectation
that schools instill "citizenship, discipline, and acceptable morals." Id.
The dissent expanded upon this notion of the school's inculcative role by stating that
school authorities have the right to punish language that falls below local definitions of
decency because the decision to condemn or tolerate such language will impact on the future
growth of the students. Id. at 1368. Furthermore, the dissent posited that one of the func-
tions of education might be the discouragement of obscene or vulgar language. Id. The Su-
preme Court expanded further on this notion by stating affirmatively that one of the pur-
poses of education is to control the use of vulgar language as well as to inculcate manners.
1987] EDUCATIONAL IDEOLOGY
singled out one of the dissent's factors, the school's unique role as
the inculcator of societal values, as the linchpin of its Fraser
opinion.178
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and reaffirmed
the traditional notion of education as an inculcative process under
the cultural transmission theory."' 9 The majority noted that
Tinker did not address a situation in which speech or action "in-
trudes upon the work of the schools."180 The Court defined this
"work" to be an inculcative, indoctrinative process that imparts
"habits and manners of civility," 181 directly contradicting Tinker's
implicit adoption of the progressive model 82 and signaling a return
to the ideas advocated in the dissenting opinions in Tinker, Goss,
and Pico.
The majority opinion, without explanation, included "society's
. . . interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appro-
priate behavior"'8s among those fundamental values the Court pre-
viously had recognized as "necessary to the maintenance of a dem-
ocratic political system.'18 4 The Court propounded an analysis that
See infra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
Judge Wright also stated that the Tinker analysis was totally inapplicable to a regula-
tion that "prescribes only the indecent manner in which an idea is expressed." 755 F.2d at
1368. He argued that the Supreme Court formulated the Tinker standard in the context of
pure political speech, an issue on which schools must remain neutral. Thus, the Court re-
quired substantial disruption if schools were to regulate such speech. Id. In contrast, the
dissent pointed out that the Court has allowed regulation of the time and place of expres-
sion when ideas are communicated in an indecent manner. Cf. Note, supra note 175, at
1178-92 (analyzing Ninth Circuit opinion in terms of the time, place, manner regulation
doctrine). Therefore, the indecent manner of expression may be regulated exclusive of the
Tinker disruption standard. Rather than distinguish Tinker in this fashion, the Supreme
Court chose to distinguish it as a situation in which the speech did not intrude upon the
work of the schools. This allowed the Court to expound upon the importance of value incul-
cation. See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
178. See infra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
179. Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined Chief Justice Burger's
opinion. Thus, in addition to Justice White, who concurred in Pico because of the un-
resolved factual controversy, all the Pico dissenters joined the Fraser majority. Justice
Brennan, the author of the Pico plurality opinion, concurred in the judgment, Justice Black-
mun concurred in the result without opinion, and Justices Marshall and Stevens filed dis-
senting opinions.
180. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3162. While this is true, Tinker did not question the impor-
tance of student expression and interaction in the educational process. Chief Justice Bur-
ger's emphasis on the "work of the schools" allowed him to expand or contract the Tinker
holding simply by redefining the role of student participation in education.
181. Id. at 3164 (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
228 (1968)).
182. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
183. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3164.
184. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979); see also Board of Educ. v. Pico,
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balanced the rights of those who advocate unpopular views and the
school's interest in inculcating habits and manners.185 The majority
drew an analogy to the procedural rules of legislatures that pro-
hibit the use of offensive expressions, stating that if the United
States Congress may ban offensive expression, then public schools
need not tolerate such expressions. 8 ' In addition to identifying the
inculcation of habits and manners of civility as a fundamental
value, the majority went beyond the tentative assertion of the
Ninth Circuit dissenter 8 7 and explicitly stated that one function of
public education is "to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive
terms in public discourse."' 8
The majority repeatedly emphasized the work of the schools
as being an inculcative mission, in which the local school board is
in the best position to determine the appropriateness of student
expression.'89 This inculcative mission, stated the Court, "is not
confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class,"' 90 but ex-
tends to all aspects of the school environment' and should be
457 U.S. 853, 870-72 (1982) (plurality opinion); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
185. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3164. If such a general interest as teaching socially appropri-
ate behavior can prevail against the nonobscene and arguably nondisruptive speech given by
Fraser, however, one must question the validity of the balancing.
Additionally, the school district in Fraser engaged in the direct suppression of student
expression, while in Pico the school board placed no direct restraints on the students. Chief
Justice Burger found the lack of direct external control on the students' ability to express
themselves an important factor in his Pico dissent that would have upheld the school
board's power to remove library books. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 885 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
In Fraser direct suppression of expression appears to elicit no closer scrutiny by Chief Jus-
tice Burger.
186. 106 S. Ct. at 3164. This analogy is not entirely accurate given the rationale be-
hind the Fraser opinion and the nature of education. One purpose of the legislature's rules
is to ensure the maintenance of order and control in the legislature. The majority opinion
neither mentioned such a purpose nor suggested that Fraser's speech was materially disrup-
tive. The sanction approved by the Fraser Court was not motivated by a concern for order
or control. Moreover, the special environment of the school may dictate that colorful expres-
sion be allowed because it stimulates student interaction as a part of the educational pro-
cess. In the legislative setting, colorful expression may be prohibited because it does not
educate anyone.
187. See supra note 177.
188. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3165.
189. Id. The Court makes no mention of the Tinker disruption standard that appears
to be the logical grounds upon which to decide the case. The Court simply could have said,
as Justice Brennan did in his concurrence, that Fraser's speech was sufficiently disruptive of
the educational process to justify sanction. Instead, the Court expounded upon the role of
the state as inculcator and the task of the local officials to determine whether student
speech is appropriate-not disruptive.
190. Id.
191. The Court's statement is an implicit rejection of the Pico plurality's assertion
that the state's inculcative interests are strongest in the classroom and diminish to nothing
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taught by example. Because the Court sees inculcation as ex-
tending outside the formal instruction of the classroom, both
teachers and older students serve as role models and must teach by
example. 192 The Court effectively held that because older students
function as role models, the state may limit their expression as
part of the inculcative process.193 Thus, in the space of two pages,
the Court refused to apply the Tinker analysis, emphasized pri-
marily the inculcative nature of education, expanded inculcative
goals to include fostering "habits and manners of civility," and ex-
tended the state's indoctrinative reach throughout the entire
school environment.
The majority also relied on the indecent nature of Fraser's
speech to uphold the school board's decision. The majority, citing
Ginsberg,"" Pico,195 and Pacifica,' held that the state has an in-
terest in protecting minors from exposure to sexually explicit or
within the sphere of the school library. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 868-69
(1982) (plurality opinion). The Court, by extending the inculcative reach of the state into all
areas of the school, rejects the Ninth Circuit's attempt to identify the questioned activity or
speech as curricular or not. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
192. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3165. This assertion is consistent with the progressive ideology
and Barnette's language concerning teaching by example because the role model would
demonstrate the proper or desired behavior without directly imposing this behavior on the
students. When direct suppression of expression is used to create proper role models, how-
ever, the system is closer to cultural transmission. This emphasis on teaching by example is
similar to the associationist theory of learning under the cultural transmission ideology. See
supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
193. The Court's assertion effectively makes the older students couriers for the gov-
ernment's inculcation of habits and manners of civility. Under a Fraser-type model inten-
sive inculcation in public schools could make students vehicles for government sponsored
opinions and beliefs. Cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding individual
cannot be required to display state motto on vehicle license plates).
Another rationale used by Chief Justice Burger to justify his majority opinion is the
risk that unless the school took some action against Fraser, students would view the school's
inaction as condoning such language. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3166 (stating that "it was per-
fectly appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils that
vulgar speech ... is wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public school edu-
cation"); see also Pico, 457 U.S. at 890 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (retaining books is an im-
plicit endorsement of contents).
In Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986), however, the
dissenters, including Chief Justice Burger, felt that high school students were sufficiently
mature to differentiate between state established religion and individual participation in
religion; therefore, the dissenters would have allowed the students in Bender to conduct
prayer meetings during student activity periods. Id. at 1336, 1338 (dissenting opinions).
Chief Justice Burger appears to consider the ability of students to differentiate school ac-
quiescence from affirmative support as one that varies with the issues presented.
194. 390 U.S. 629 (1968); see supra note 165.
195. 457 U.S. 853 (1982); see supra notes 144-67 and accompanying text.
196. 438 U.S. 762 (1978); see supra note 165.
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indecent materials because the public schools act in loco parentis
to protect a captive audience.19 7 The majority, however, overlooked
both the Ninth Circuit majority's treatment of Pacifica,198 a case
that concerned a much younger group of children, 199 and the dif-
ference between a Pico-type failure to provide information and a
direct suppression of student expression.00 While either the Gins-
berg line of cases or Tinker's disruption standard supports restrict-
ing indecent student speech, the majority's primary reliance on the
inculcative nature of education signals a shift in its attitude toward
education.
At the end of its analysis, the Fraser majority quoted Justice
Black's Tinker dissent for the proposition that permitting a speech
such as Fraser's would be tantamount to turning control of the
school over to the students. 01 This quotation is significant because
it implicitly reinstates discipline as a goal of education-a goal
that the Tinker majority impliedly had rejected.0 2 The Fraser
Court effectively held that secondary students are not sufficiently
mature to engage in an extensive self-governing system. The Court
also backed away from John Dewey's philosophy of progressive ed-
ucation under which student participation and interaction are so
vitally important.203 Because the Fraser opinion implied that sec-
ondary students are not sufficiently mature to be self-governing
and their contributions to the educational process are slight, the
Court gave itself the flexibility to move toward a curtailment of
197. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3165; see supra note 165. The Court chose not to expound upon
this rationale and simply mentioned it in passing.
198. See Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 755 F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th Cir. 1985) (refusing to
extend the Pacifica rational, see supra note 165, from the broadcasting context to the high
school assembly because the students were voluntarily present, which meant they had less
expectation of privacy than in their homes).
199. Throughout the majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger refers to the high school
audience as "children." See Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3164-65. Justice Powell, also a member of
the Fraser majority, previously referred to high school students in Pico as children. See
Pico, 457 U.S. at 897 (Powell, J., dissenting). As Justice Stevens points out in his Fraser
dissent, 106 S. Ct. at 3169 n.2, however, four members of the Fraser majority-Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and Powell-would treat high school students like
college students when a more orthodox message is being conveyed. See Bender v. Williams-
port Area School Dist., 106 S. Ct. 1326, 1336, 1338 (1986) (dissenting opinions).
200. See supra note 185.
201. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3166. In Tinker Justice Black stated: "I wish therefore ...
to disclaim any purpose . . . to hold that the federal Constitution compels the teachers,
parents and elected school officials to surrender control of the American public school sys-
tem to public school students." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting).
202. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
976 [Vol. 40:939
EDUCATIONAL IDEOLOGY
student expressive and participatory rights. At a minimum, the
Court articulated an educational philosophy supporting a low tol-
erance level for less than orthodox forms of student expression.
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan specifically rejected the
implications of the majority opinion by limiting the breadth of the
Court's holding20° and applying the traditional Tinker analysis.
Justice Brennan found Fraser's speech disruptive of the educa-
tional process under the Tinker disruption standard2 0 5 without in-
cluding any dicta on the proper inculcative role of the school or the
need for older students to teach by example. Furthermore, he
pointed out that suppression in this case was not motivated by any
disagreement with Fraser's views nor was it an attempt to ban
written materials the faculty considered inappropriate. 06
V. THE TINKER ANALYSIS: A WORKABLE ACCOMMODATION
The adoption of a particular educational ideology determines,
in part, the relationship between the state as teacher and the child
as student. The cultural transmission ideology requires the child to
internalize cultural knowledge through a system of explicit instruc-
tion. This theory limits the child's expressive freedom because ex-
pression of the child's ideas receives little importance. The roman-
tic ideology posits that the child, as a unique individual, must be
placed in an sufficiently free environment to allow development
through innate patterns. Freedoms are not as important to the
child's active development because the child matures on his own
without forced interaction with his environment. The progressive
ideology stresses child development through active stimulation and
interaction. Under this theory the child's expressive behavior and
ideas assume primary importance. Depending upon the educa-
tional ideology, the child's rights of free expression and thought
assume lesser or greater importance.
204. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3167 (Brennan, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 3168. Justice Brennan, relying on his plurality opinion in Board of Educa-
tion v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 855-75 (1982), see supra notes 154-160 and accompanying text,
emphasized that the school's interests in teaching proper discourse vary within the different
parts of the school. Justice Brennan felt that Fraser's speech, if given under different cir-
cumstances, might have been protected "where the school's legitimate interests in teaching
and maintaining civil discourse were less weighty." Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3168 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
Justice Marshall also applied the disruption test, but dissented because the school had
failed, in his opinion, to demonstrate that Fraser's speech was in fact disruptive. Id. at 3168-
69 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 3167 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Neither the romantic nor cultural transmission ideologies rec-
ognize the public school's dual role as the inculcator of societal val-
ues and the cultivator of independent, free thinking citizens. The
romantic ideology undermines the socializing function of public ed-
ucation by permitting students to develop without sufficient guid-
ance. The state does not require public school attendance to pro-
vide a place where students may do whatever they please. The
cultural transmission ideology, however, undermines the individu-
alistic aspects of education by requiring students to passively ab-
sorb without critical examination. Although the school serves a so-
cializing role, the student must grow into an independent and
active citizen capable of full and informed participation in society.
The student must be actively involved in the educational process
and free to express individual opinions in order accomplish this
growth.
Notwithstanding the inadequacy of the cultural transmission
ideology, the Supreme Court applied a strict cultural transmission
analysis in the Fraser decision. The Court chose to emphasize the
school's extensive inculcative role, local control, and teaching by
example rather than the Tinker disruption standard or the inde-
cent nature of the student's speech. This emphasis indicates the
Court's evolving preference for the cultural transmission ideology
in secondary education and a belief that wide-ranging expressive
rights of students defeat the inculcative functions of the public
high school. Because the majority apparently endorses inculcation
through direct suppression of student expression, Fraser allows in-
creased restrictions on student diversity and unorthodoxy. At a
minimum, Fraser provides the proper ideology for decreased judi-
cial intervention in the public schools.
If Fraser signals a change in the Court's ideological perspec-
tive, the Court will manifest this change through a selective appli-
cation of accepted constitutional law doctrines. Because the Court
does not phrase its opinions in terms of educational philosophy,
the constitutional principles chosen to support its decisions reflect
the Court's conception of the proper role of education. Constitu-
tional doctrines such as freedom of speech and the compelling
state interest test are the vehicles through which the Court applies
its educational philosophy. To the extent the Supreme Court has
an unarticulated belief about the proper role of education in soci-
ety, the Court applies these doctrines to effect that belief.
The Court's choice of a particular doctrine either will support
or undercut one of the educational ideologies discussed above. If
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the Court believes the cultural transmission ideology most accu-
rately describes the ideal role of public education, the Court will
serve that goal by emphasizing the limited constitutional status of
schoolchildren and the state's compelling interest in public educa-
tion as rationales for its decisions. If, however, the Court concludes
that the progressive or romantic ideologies best describe the proper
role of education, the Court will apply freedom of speech, the right
to receive, the right to academic freedom, or the rights of dissent-
ing parents and teachers, to restrict excessive state indoctrination
in the public schools. Constitutional doctrines not only manifest
the Court's attitude toward education, but are the threads that
bind its entire case-by-case development into a unified whole.
Given the complex and often antagonistic relationship be-
tween the educational ideologies, the constitutional doctrines, and
the rights of parents, teachers, and students discussed above, the
Court's difficulty in formulating a coherent educational ideology is
understandable. Fraser may be an attempt by the Court to take a
firm stand favoring the cultural transmission ideology. The Court,
however, has ignored the Tinker analysis-the analysis most con-
sistent with a realistic and ideologically sound accommodation be-
tween cultural transmission and progressivism.
The Tinker disruption analysis recognizes the importance of
student expression and independent thought to the educational
process while maintaining a limited curricular inculcative presence
in the school. Tinker provides for maximum student expression,
ensuring continued individualized growth of students. If education
is expected to prepare children to participate in a democratic soci-
ety and encourage their growth and development into mature and
rational adults, the school environment must place a premium on
student expression and interaction. Encouraging cognitive conflict
and expressive behavior in the school not only forces students to
express their own judgments or opinions, but also serves the first
amendment goals of self-fulfillment, enlightenment, and prepara-
tion of children for participation in a democratic society.
On the other hand, Tinker allows an "inculcative" interest of
sorts in the school as well. School authorities do not inculcate val-
ues directly to children. Curriculum content and teacher role mod-
els are strong voices in the marketplace, emphasizing that some
judgments are more adequate than others. School authorities have
the power to encourage an awareness of justice-principles of lib-
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erty, equality, and reciprocity207-but not the right to suppress
student speech and ideas in order to inculcate community values.
Under Tinker the school's right to sanction student participation
in the dialectical process of education arises only when student
speech threatens this core inculcative interest. For example, this
threat may occur when student speech interferes with the orderly
operation of the school. The disruption standard provides courts
with a concrete construct to resolve these questions rather than the
illusive concept of the proper "habits and manners" schools are
supposed to inculcate.
Although the Tinker standard is no panacea 208 and some com-
mentators question the applicability of a progressivist or analytical
presence at the secondary level, 2 0  Tinker represents a realistic at-
tempt to harmonize cultural transmission and progressivist ideolo-
gies, both of which play important roles in secondary education. If
the Court is not to "strangle the free mind at its source," it must
recognize and emphasize the importance of student speech and in-
teraction at the secondary level-exactly what it failed to do in
Fraser by choosing not to apply the Tinker analysis.
207. Many commentators have approved the inculcation of these general principles.
See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 17, at 556-57 (allowing only inculcation of those values explicit
or implicit in the Constitution); Freeman, supra note 109, at 56-57 (examining learned ma-
terial's proximity to constitutionally or legally based values); Kohlberg & Mayer, supra note
18, at 473-76 (basing progressivist education on ethical principles, not rules or values).
Although prior to Fraser the Supreme Court had approved only state efforts to incul-
cate "general and system-supporting values," Note, supra note 64, at 523, the Court implic-
itly abandoned such a limitation in Fraser. The Fraser Court's approval of the inculcation
of "habits and manners of civility," though arguably system-supporting, permits govern-
ment inculcation of specific traits of the individual in which the government has no interest
under Tinker except when acting to prevent disruption.
If the Court allows the inculcation of specific "manners," the Barnette problem
resurfaces-societal conflict over selection of specific values. See supra note 72. Justice
Powell's cherished concept of local control directly implicates such a problem.
208. The Tinker disruption standard fails to address those situations in which student
speech is nondisruptive, but nevertheless incompatible with the school's functions. Racially
or religiously inflammatory speeches are examples of such situations that probably should
be subject to sanction. See Berkman, Students in Court: Free Speech and the Functions of
Schooling in America, 40 HARv. EDUC. REv. 567, 592-93 (1970); Diamond, supra note 29, at
502; Garvey, supra note 91, at 363-64.
209. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 29, at 498-502 (asserting that the Tinker analysis
undercuts the inculcative purpose of public secondary education); Goldstein, The Asserted
Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA.
L. REv., 1293, 1350-55 (1976) (arguing progressivist model not constitutionally mandated);
Van den Haag, Academic Freedom in the United States, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 515,
516 (1963).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion tracks the Supreme Court's changing
attitude toward education from Tinker's progressivism through
Pico's rough accommodation between inculcation and individual-
ism to the Court's implicit application of the cultural transmission
ideology in Fraser. This Note demonstrates that the Court's con-
ception of the proper role of education in society, as manifested by
application of conventional constitutional doctrines, impacts di-
rectly on the roles of both the school and student. Finally, this
Note advances the Tinker analysis as the best and most workable
framework to resolve the conflicting demands of educational theory
while preserving both student freedom and limited socialization.
Only future cases will disclose whether the Court continues to
apply the cultural transmission ideology. One case in which the
Court may clarify its educational philosophy is Mozert v. Hawkins
County Public Schools.2 10 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee applied a romantic ideology to allow
fundamentalist children to opt out of a reading program in the
public schools. 21' The district court found that the burden placed
on the fundamentalists outweighed the government's interest in
educating children.12 If the Supreme Court hears Mozert and
210. 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
211. Mozert concerns a free exercise challenge by fundamentalist students and parents
to the Hawkins County School District's selection of certain textbooks. This case directly
implicates the state's interest in public education and the proper weight to be accorded that
interest. The district court's opinion reflects a romantic ideology that the Supreme Court
may reject as inconsistent with Fraser's role of education. For a discussion of the romantic
ideology, see supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text. By allowing the fundamentalist chil-
dren to opt out of the reading program, the district court minimized both the state's incul-
cative interest in achieving uniformity and the state's progressive interest in exposing chil-
dren to a broad spectrum of knowledge and ideas. A strict application of either the
progressive or cultural transmissions ideologies would implicate a much stronger state inter-
est that might outweigh the apparently minimal burden placed on the fundamentalists.
212. The district court, in essentially a two-step analysis, held that the compulsory use
of the Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston basic reading series impermissibly burdened plaintiffs'
free exercise of religion and that the state's interest in literacy and good citizenship, al-
though compelling, could be achieved without forcing the students to read the Holt series.
In balancing the burden placed on the fundamentalists against the government's interest in
educating children, the court found opting out to be a less restrictive means of accommodat-
ing the litigants' interests.
The district court reasoned that because Tennessee already had provided a total opt
out in its home schooling statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3050 (Supp. 1986), this alterna-
tive also would work for a single subject. According to the court, proof at trial demonstrated
that such an opt out was possible without disrupting the educational process. The court also
noted that "such an accommodation might . . . impress upon the student body the high
regard this society has for religious freedom." Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1202. Furthermore,
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adopts a progressive ideology, the Court would reverse and compel
the children's attendance because progressivism emphasizes inter-
action and exposure to diverse ideas.213 A more likely scenario
would be for the Court to hear this case and apply a cultural trans-
mission ideology. 214 Under these circumstances, the Court would
reverse because the state's interest in uniformity and socialization
would outweigh the burden placed on the fundamentalists.215 If the
Court accepts the substantially inculcative nature of public educa-
tion, as it appears to have done in Fraser, the Court would face the
problem of factions vying for control of the school curricula.216
Given the dangers of cultural transmission and the importance of
individualism in American democracy, one can only hope that Fra-
ser is not the beginning of the end for the progressivist presence in
secondary education.
WILLIAM B. SENHAUSER*
the district court stressed that its opinion would not require the school system to make the
option available to any other persons or to these plaintiffs in any other subject area. Id. at
1203.
213. For a discussion of the progressive ideology, see supra notes 43-53 and accompa-
nying text. By reading the Holt series, children would be exposed to a multitude of ideas,
thereby stimulating cognitive conflict, active discussion, and intellectual growth. These ben-
efits to the fundamentalist's children might provide a state interest counterbalancing the
parents' interest in sheltering their children from exposure to material arguably violative of
their religious values.
214. Justice Powell's retirement, however, may affect the future development of the
Supreme Court's implicit educational ideology. As the cultural transmission ideology's most
ardent supporter, Justice Powell influenced his fellow Justices' views on the proper role of
education in society. If Justice Powell's successor is less supportive of the cultural transmis-
sion ideology the Court may be more inclined to halt or reverse its retreat from Tinker.
215. For a discussion of the cultural transmission ideology, see supra notes 19-34 and
accompanying text. If the state allows children to opt out in any significant numbers, the
socializing function of the public schools, stressed by the Supreme Court in its opinion in
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986), see supra notes 212-16 and
accompanying text, would be reduced substantially or even destroyed.
216. See supra note 72 (quoting the majority opinion in Barnette as warning of fac-
tional conflict for control of which programs the state will compel children to embrace).
* The author wishes to thank Professor James F. Blumstein for providing the topic for
this Note and Professors Thomas R. McCoy and Robert D. Kamenshine for their comments
and suggestions.
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